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What is a risen caused from: Symptoms, Causes, Diagnosis, Treatment, Surgery


Symptoms, Causes, Diagnosis, Treatment, Surgery

There’s a type of cyst you can get at the bottom of your tailbone, or coccyx. It’s called a pilonidal cyst, and it can become infected and filled with pus. Once infected, the technical term is “pilonidal abscess,” and it can be painful.

It looks like a large pimple at the bottom of your tailbone. It is more common in men than in women. It usually happens more often in younger people.

People who sit a lot, such as truck drivers, have a higher chance of getting one.

They can be treated. If your cyst becomes a problem, your doctor can drain it or take it out through surgery.

What Causes a Pilonidal Cyst?

Most doctors think that ingrown hairs are the reason for many of them. Pilonidal means “nest of hair,” and doctors sometimes find hair follicles inside the cyst.

Another theory is that pilonidal cysts appear after a trauma to that region of your body.

During World War II, more than 80,000 soldiers got pilonidal cysts that put them in the hospital. People thought they were because of irritation from riding in bumpy Jeeps. For a while, the condition was called “Jeep disease.”

You might be more likely to get one if you were born with a small dimple in the skin between your buttocks. This dimple can tend to get infected, though doctors aren’t exactly sure why.

Other risk factors include obesity, large amounts of hair, not enough exercise, prolonged sitting, and excessive sweating.


The symptoms of a pilonidal cyst include:

  • Pain, redness, and swelling at the bottom of the spine
  • Pus or blood draining out of it
  • Bad smell from the pus
  • Tenderness to the touch
  • Fever

They can vary in size. Yours may be a small dimple or cover a large, painful area.

When Should I Call a Doctor?

A pilonidal cyst is an abscess or boil. Treatment may include antibiotics, hot compresses and topical treatment with depilatory creams. In more severe cases it needs to be drained, or lanced, to heal. Like other boils, it does not get better with antibiotics.

If you have any of the symptoms, call your doctor.


Your doctor can diagnose a pilonidal cyst with a physical exam and by asking you questions about it. Among the things they may ask you:

  • When did you first feel symptoms?
  • Have you had this problem before?
  • Have you had a fever?
  • What medications or supplements do you take?

What Can I Do to Feel Better?

Early in the infection of a pilonidal cyst, the redness, swelling, and pain may not be too bad. Some things you might want to try:

  • To ease any pain, soak in a tub of warm water. Sometimes, your cyst may open and drain on its own this way.
  • Take nonprescription pain medicine, but follow the dosing instructions.
  • Keep the cyst and area around it clean and dry.


Antibiotics do not heal a pilonidal cyst. But doctors have any number of procedures they can try. Here are some options:

Incision and drainage: This is the preferred method for a first pilonidal cyst. Your doctor makes a cut into the cyst and drains it. They remove any hair follicles and leaves the wound open, packing the space with gauze.

Advantage — It’s a simple procedure done under local anesthesia, meaning just the area around the cyst is numbed.

Disadvantage — You have to change the gauze often until the cyst heals, which sometimes takes up to 3 weeks.

Marsupialization: In this procedure, your doctor makes a cut and drains the cyst, removing pus and any hair that are inside. They’ll sew the edges of the cut to the wound edges to make a pouch.

Advantages — This is outpatient surgery under local anesthesia. It also lets the doctor make a smaller, shallower cut so that you don’t need to take out and repack gauze daily.

Disadvantages — It takes about 6 weeks to heal, and you need a doctor specially trained in the technique.

Incision, drainage, closing of wound: In this technique, the cyst is drained, but it’s not left open.

Advantage — You don’t need to pack gauze because your doctor fully closes the wound right after surgery.

Disadvantages — You’re more likely to have more problems with the cyst down the road. It’s harder to remove the entire cyst with this method. It’s usually done in an operating room with a specially trained surgeon.’

Other surgical procedures include complete cyst and cyst wall excision along with the pilonidal sinus tracts, the use of fibrin glue, and taking (core out) only diseased tissue and the cyst out with punch biopsies.

After Surgery

Follow all of your doctor’s instructions about at-home care, especially if you need to remove and pack gauze. Other tips:

  • Try to keep the area clean.
  • Check for any signs of a new infection, such as redness, pus, or pain.
  • Keep your follow-up appointments with your doctor so they can see how your cyst is healing.

A complete cure is possible, but remember that a pilonidal cyst may recur even if you had one surgically removed.

Boils and carbuncles: Overview – InformedHealth.org


A boil (furuncle) is a pus-filled bump in the skin that is caused by a bacterial infection. It’s a bit like a very big yellow pimple, but it’s deeper in the skin and hurts a lot more.

Boils develop when a hair follicle and the surrounding tissue become infected. Hair follicles consist of one hair, the root of the hair, a sebaceous gland and a small muscle that can pull the hair up, making it stand on end. Hair follicle inflammations are sometimes also referred to as “deep folliculitis” or “perifolliculitis.”

The infection causes the skin tissue inside the boil to die, creating a pus-filled hollow space (an abscess). Skin abscesses can develop from boils, but also from other things like infected insect bites or injections with dirty needles. If several boils merge into a larger bump, it’s called a carbuncle.

Sometimes boils go away again on their own, without causing any problems. But it’s often a good idea to get medical treatment. This can help make boils go away quicker, relieve the pain and prevent complications.

Different types of hair follicle infections


Boils are painful swollen bumps, ranging from roughly the size of a cherry stone to that of a walnut. They feel warm and look red, and yellowish pus may show through the skin. If a cluster of boils (a carbuncle) develops, the infection might cause a fever too, making you feel weak and tired.

Boils mainly occur on the face and neck, including the back of the neck. But they sometimes also develop in the armpits, groin, genital area, on the back, bottom or thighs.

Causes and risk factors

Boils are caused by bacteria, most commonly by Staphylococcus aureus bacteria (a staph infection). A lot of people have these bacteria on their skin or – for instance – in the lining of their nostrils, without them causing any problems.

They are more likely to lead to boils or other skin infections in people who have weakened immune systems. For this reason, boils are more common in people with medical conditions such as diabetes, chronic infections or cancer. They are also more common in people with eczema, conjunctivitis or certain allergies such as allergic asthma.

Prevalence and outlook

Skin infections are generally very common, but most of them are caused by something else. Only about 3 out of 100 people who go to their doctor with a skin infection have a boil.

Boils develop within a few hours or days. Once the pus has escaped from the red, swollen lump after a few days – either on its own or following treatment – the boil heals within a few weeks. A small scar is left behind.

Sometimes boils heal without the pus coming out. The pus is then broken down by the body.


If you squeeze a boil or scratch it open, the bacteria might spread in the body along the blood or lymph vessels. If, for instance, you can see a red streak leading away from the boil, it means that the infection is moving along a lymph vessel (lymphangitis). Lymph nodes in the affected area may also become inflamed and hurt (lymphadenitis).

People sometimes think that the red streak caused by lymphangitis is a sign of blood poisoning (sepsis). But this very rare, severe complication only develops if a lot of bacteria enter the blood at once and quickly spread throughout the whole body.

If boils occur on the face – particularly around the nose and upper lip area – there’s a certain risk that the bacteria might get into the brain, where they could lead to meningitis or life-threatening blood clots in the large blood vessels (called cerebral venous sinus thrombosis, or CVST).

Especially in people with a weakened immune system, boils can keep coming back or occur in several different places at the same time. Doctors call this furunculosis.

If several boils develop in neighboring hair follicles and merge into a larger connected area of infection under the skin, it’s called a carbuncle. Carbuncles often occur at the back of the neck, and go deeper into the tissue than boils do.


Doctors usually recognize boils based on their typical appearance and a description of the symptoms. Further diagnostic procedures such as blood tests or a pus swab are only needed if someone often gets boils, has several boils at the same time, or is thought to be at high risk of complications.

The pus is examined in a laboratory in order to find out exactly what kind of bacteria are causing the infection, and determine which antibiotics are most likely to work the best. Blood tests help to find out whether the infection has already spread and whether the person has any other medical conditions that could increase the risk of bacterial infections occurring.


Boils are usually treated by a doctor. The treatment typically involves opening the pus-filled abscess with a small cut, draining the pus, disinfecting the wound and placing strips of sterile gauze inside it to soak up and remove any remaining pus. The wound stays open while healing, so it doesn’t have to be sewn shut. It’s very important not to squeeze boils yourself – especially if they’re on your face.

If a boil is still growing in size, the abscess hasn’t yet fully developed. Doctors can feel the boil with their hands to see whether that is the case. In this phase, you can try to start or speed up the healing process by applying a warm, moist cloth or a special ointment that draws (pulls) pus out of the boil. This kind of ointment is also known as “drawing salve”.

Antibiotics are only needed if complications are likely or have already occurred – for instance, if several boils have merged and developed into a carbuncle. People then sometimes go to the hospital to get antibiotics through a drip (an infusion). It is particularly important that carbuncles are cut open so that the pus can escape. The wound is then repeatedly cleansed using an antiseptic solution.

Further information

When people are ill or need medical advice, they usually go to see their family doctor first. Read about how to find the right doctor, how to prepare for the appointment and what to remember.


  • Gesenhues S, Gesenhues A, Weltermann B. Praxisleitfaden Allgemeinmedizin. Bad Wörishofen: Urban und Fischer; 2017.

  • Moll I. Duale Reihe Dermatologie. Stuttgart: Thieme; 2016.

  • Pschyrembel. Klinisches Wörterbuch. Berlin: De Gruyter; 2017.

  • Sterry W. Kurzlehrbuch Dermatologie. Stuttgart: Thieme; 2011.

  • IQWiG health information is written with the aim of helping
    people understand the advantages and disadvantages of the main treatment options and health
    care services.

    Because IQWiG is a German institute, some of the information provided here is specific to the
    German health care system. The suitability of any of the described options in an individual
    case can be determined by talking to a doctor. We do not offer individual consultations.

    Our information is based on the results of good-quality studies. It is written by a
    team of
    health care professionals, scientists and editors, and reviewed by external experts. You can
    find a detailed description of how our health information is produced and updated in
    our methods.

Vital Signs of the Planet

To make better predictions about the future impacts of sea level rise, new techniques are being developed to fill gaps in the historic record of sea level measurements. We know the factors that play a role in sea level rise: Melting glaciers and ice sheets add water to the seas, and warmer temperatures cause water to expand. Other factors are known to slow the rise, such as dams impounding water on the land, stymying its flow into the sea.

When each factor is added together, this estimate should match the sea level that scientists observe. Until now, however, the sea level “budget” has fallen short of the observed sea level rise, leading scientists to question why the budget wouldn’t balance.

A new study published on Aug. 19 seeks to balance this budget. By gaining new insights to historic measurements, scientists can better forecast how each of these factors will affect sea level rise and how this rise will impact us in the future.

For example, in its recent flooding report, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) noted a rapid increase in sea level rise-related flooding events along U.S. coasts over the last 20 years, and they are expected to grow in extent, frequency, and depth as sea levels continue to rise.

Factors Driving Our Rising Seas

On reexamining each of the known contributors to sea level rise from 1900 to 2018, the research, led by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California, uses improved estimates and applies satellite data to better understand historic measurements.

The researchers found that estimates of global sea level variations based on tide-gauge observations had slightly overestimated global sea levels before the 1970s. (Located at coastal stations scattered around the globe, tide gauges are used to measure sea level height.) They also found that mountain glacier meltwater was adding more water to the oceans than previously realized but that the relative contribution of glaciers to sea level rise is slowly decreasing. And they discovered that glacier and Greenland ice sheet mass loss explain the increased rate of sea level rise before 1940.

This infographic shows the rise in sea levels since 1900. Pre-1940, glaciers and Greenland meltwater dominated the rise; dam projects slowed the rise in the 1970s. Now, ice sheet and glacier melt, plus thermal expansion, dominate the rise. Tide-gauge data shown in blue and satellite data in orange. Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech

In addition, the new study found that during the 1970s, when dam construction was at its peak, sea level rise slowed to a crawl. Dams create reservoirs that can impound freshwater that would normally flow straight into the sea.

“That was one of the biggest surprises for me,” said lead researcher Thomas Frederikse, a postdoctoral fellow at JPL, referring to the peak in global dam projects at that time. “We impounded so much freshwater, humanity nearly brought sea level rise to a halt.”

Since the 1990s, however, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet mass loss and thermal expansion have accelerated sea level rise, while freshwater impoundment has decreased. As our climate continues to warm, the majority of this thermal energy is absorbed by the oceans, causing the volume of the water to expand. In fact, ice sheet melt and thermal expansion now account for about two-thirds of observed global mean sea level rise. Mountain glacier meltwater currently contributes another 20%, while declining freshwater water storage on land adds the remaining 10%.

All told, sea levels have risen on average 1.6 millimeters (0.063 inches) per year between 1900 and 2018. In fact, sea levels are rising at a faster rate than at any time in the 20th century. But previous estimates of the mass of melting ice and thermal expansion of the ocean fell short of explaining this rate, particularly before the era of precise satellite observations of the world’s oceans, creating a deficit in the historic sea level budget.

Finding a Balance

In simple terms, the sea level budget should balance if the known factors are accurately estimated and added together. It’s a bit like balancing the transactions in your bank account: Added together, all the transactions in your statement should match the total. If they don’t, you may have overlooked a transaction or two.

The same logic can be applied to the sea level budget: When each factor that affects sea level is added together, this estimate should match the sea level that scientists observe. Until now, however, the sea level budget has fallen short of the observed sea level rise.

“That was a problem,” said Frederikse. “How could we trust projections of future sea level change without fully understanding what factors are driving the changes that we have seen in the past?”

Frederikse led an international team of scientists to develop a state-of-the-art framework that pulls together the advances in each area of study – from sea level models to satellite observations – to improve our understanding of the factors affecting sea level rise for the past 120 years.

The latest satellite observations came from the pair of NASA – German Aerospace Center (DLR) Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) satellites that operated from 2002-2017, and their successor pair, the NASA – German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ) GRACE Follow-On (launched in 2018). Additional data from the series of TOPEX/Jason satellites – a joint effort of NASA and the French space agency Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales -that have operated continuously since 1992 were included in the analysis to enhance tide-gauge data.

“Tide-gauge data was the primary way to measure sea level before 1992, but sea level change isn’t uniform around the globe, so there were uncertainties in the historic estimates,” said Sönke Dangendorf, an assistant professor of oceanography at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, and a coauthor of the study. “Also, measuring each of the factors that contribute to global mean sea levels was very difficult, so it was hard to gain an accurate picture.

But over the past two decades, scientists have been “flooded” with satellite data, added Dangendorf, which has helped them precisely track the physical processes that affect sea levels.

For example, GRACE and GRACE-FO measurements have accurately tracked global water mass changes, melting glaciers, ice sheets, and how much water is stored on land. Other satellite observations have tracked how regional ocean salinity changes and thermal expansion affect some parts of the world more than others. Up-and-down movements of Earth’s crust influence the regional and global levels of the oceans as well, so these aspects were included in the team’s analysis.

“With the GRACE and GRACE-FO data we can effectively back-extrapolate the relationship between these observations and how much sea level rises at a particular place,” said Felix Landerer, project scientist at JPL for GRACE-FO and a coauthor of the study. “All observations together give us a pretty accurate idea of what contributed to sea level change since 1900, and by how much.

The study, titled “The Causes of Sea Level Rise Since 1900,” was published Aug. 19 in Nature. In addition to scientists from JPL and Old Dominion University, the project involved researchers from Caltech, Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium, University of Siegen in Germany, the National Oceanography Centre in the United Kingdom, Courant Institute in New York, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Academia Sinica in Taiwan.

JPL managed the GRACE mission and manages the GRACE-FO mission for NASA’s Earth Science Division of the Science Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters in Washington. Based on Pasadena, California, Caltech manages JPL for NASA.

News Media Contact

Ian J. O’Neill / Jane J. Lee
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif.
818-354-2649 / 818-354-0307
[email protected] / [email protected]

Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low-Lying Islands, Coasts and Communities — Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate

This chapter assesses past and future contributions to global, regional and extreme sea level changes, associated risk to low-lying islands, coasts, cities, and settlements, and response options and pathways to resilience and sustainable development along the coast.

Global mean sea level (GMSL) is rising (virtually certain) and accelerating (high confidence). The sum of glacier and ice sheet contributions is now the dominant source of GMSL rise (very high confidence). GMSL from tide gauges and altimetry observations increased from 1.4 mm yr–1 over the period 1901–1990 to 2.1 mm yr–1 over the period 1970–2015 to 3.2 mm yr–1 over the period 1993–2015 to 3.6 mm yr–1 over the period 2006–2015 (high confidence). The dominant cause of GMSL rise since 1970 is anthropogenic forcing (high confidence). {,}

GMSL was considerably higher than today during past climate states that were warmer than pre-industrial, including the Last Interglacial (LIG; 129–116 ka), when global mean surface temperature was 0.5ºC1.0ºC warmer, and the mid-Pliocene Warm Period (mPWP; ~3.3 to 3.0 million years ago), 2ºC4ºC warmer. Despite the modest global warmth of the Last Interglacial, GMSL was likely 6–9 m higher, mainly due to contributions from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets (GIS and AIS, respectively), and unlikely more than 10m higher (medium confidence). Based on new understanding about geological constraints since the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5), 25 m is a plausible upper bound on GMSL during the mPWP (low confidence). Ongoing uncertainties in palaeo sea level reconstructions and modelling hamper conclusions regarding the total magnitudes and rates of past sea level rise (SLR). Furthermore, the long (multi-millennial) time scales of these past climate and sea level changes, and regional climate influences from changes in Earth’s orbital configuration and climate system feedbacks, lead to low confidence in direct comparisons with near-term future changes. {Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1, 4.2.2,,, SM 4.1}

Non-climatic anthropogenic drivers, including recent and historical demographic and settlement trends and anthropogenic subsidence, have played an important role in increasing low-lying coastal communities’ exposure and vulnerability to SLR and extreme sea level (ESL) events (very high confidence). In coastal deltas, for example, these drivers have altered freshwater and sediment availability (high confidence). In low-lying coastal areas more broadly, human-induced changes can be rapid and modify coastlines over short periods of time, outpacing the effects of SLR (high confidence). Adaptation can be undertaken in the short- to medium-term by targeting local drivers of exposure and vulnerability, notwithstanding uncertainty about local SLR impacts in coming decades and beyond (high confidence). {, 4.3.1,,} 

Coastal ecosystems are already impacted by the combination of SLR, other climate-related ocean changes, and adverse effects from human activities on ocean and land (high confidence). Attributing such impacts to SLR, however, remains challenging due to the influence of other climate-related and non-climatic drivers such as infrastructure development and human-induced habitat degradation (high confidence). Coastal ecosystems, including saltmarshes, mangroves, vegetated dunes and sandy beaches, can build vertically and expand laterally in response to SLR, though this capacity varies across sites (high confidence). These ecosystems provide important services that include coastal protection and habitat for diverse biota. However, as a consequence of human actions that fragment wetland habitats and restrict landward migration, coastal ecosystems progressively lose their ability to adapt to climate-induced changes and provide ecosystem services, including acting as protective barriers (high confidence). {} 

Coastal risk is dynamic and increased by widely observed changes in coastal infrastructure, community livelihoods, agriculture and habitability (high confidence). As with coastal ecosystems, attribution of observed changes and associated risk to SLR remains challenging. Drivers and processes inhibiting attribution include demographic, resource and land use changes and anthropogenic subsidence. {4.3.3, 4.3.4}

A diversity of adaptation responses to coastal impacts and risks have been implemented around the world, but mostly as a reaction to current coastal risk or experienced disasters (high confidence). Hard coastal protection measures (dikes, embankments, sea walls and surge barriers) are widespread, providing predictable levels of safety in northwest Europe, East Asia, and around many coastal cities and deltas. Ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) is continuing to gain traction worldwide, providing multiple co-benefits, but there is still low agreement on its cost and long-term effectiveness. Advance, which refers to the creation of new land by building into the sea (e.g., land reclamation), has a long history in most areas where there are dense coastal populations. Accommodation measures, such as early warning systems (EWS) for ESL events, are widespread. Retreat is observed but largely restricted to small communities or carried out for the purpose of creating new wetland habitat. {,,}


Future rise in GMSL caused by thermal expansion, melting of glaciers and ice sheets and land water storage changes, is strongly dependent on which Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) emission scenario is followed. SLR at the end of the century is projected to be faster under all scenarios, including those compatible with achieving the long-term temperature goal set out in the Paris Agreement. GMSL will rise between 0.43 m (0.290.59 m, likely range; RCP2.6) and 0.84 m (0.611.10 m, likely range; RCP8.5) by 2100 (medium confidence) relative to 19862005. Beyond 2100, sea level will continue to rise for centuries due to continuing deep ocean heat uptake and mass loss of the GIS and AIS and will remain elevated for thousands of years (high confidence). Under RCP8.5, estimates for 2100 are higher and the uncertainty range larger than in AR5. Antarctica could contribute up to 28 cm of SLR (RCP8.5, upper end of likely range) by the end of the century (medium confidence). Estimates of SLR higher than the likely range are also provided here for decision makers with low risk tolerance. {SR1.5, 4.1,,}

Under RCP8.5, the rate of SLR will be 15 mm yr–1 (1020 mm yr–1, likely range) in 2100, and could exceed several cm yr–1 in the 22nd century. These high rates challenge the implementation of adaptation measures that involve a long lead time, but this has not yet been studied in detail. {,} 

Processes controlling the timing of future ice shelf loss and the spatial extent of ice sheet instabilities could increase Antarctica’s contribution to SLR to values higher than the likely range on century and longer time scales (low confidence). Evolution of the AIS beyond the end of the 21st century is characterized by deep uncertainty as ice sheet models lack realistic representations of some of the underlying physical processes. The few model studies available addressing time scales of centuries to millennia indicate multi-metre (2.3–5.4 m) rise in sea level for RCP8.5 (low confidence). There is low confidence in threshold temperatures for ice sheet instabilities and the rates of GMSL rise they can produce. {Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3, and Sections 4.1,,,}

Sea level rise is not globally uniform and varies regionally. Thermal expansion, ocean dynamics and land ice loss contributions will generate regional departures of about ±30% around the GMSL rise. Differences from the global mean can be greater than ±30% in areas of rapid vertical land movements, including those caused by local anthropogenic factors such as groundwater extraction (high confidence). Subsidence caused by human activities is currently the most important cause of relative sea level rise (RSL) change in many delta regions. While the comparative importance of climate-driven RSL rise will increase over time, these findings on anthropogenic subsidence imply that a consideration of local processes is critical for projections of sea level impacts at local scales (high confidence). {,} 

Due to projected GMSL rise, ESLs that are historically rare (for example, today’s hundred-year event) will become common by 2100 under all RCPs (high confidence). Many low-lying cities and small islands at most latitudes will experience such events annually by 2050. Greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation envisioned in low-emission scenarios (e.g., RCP2.6) is expected to sharply reduce but not eliminate risk to low-lying coasts and islands from SLR and ESL events. Low-emission scenarios lead to slower rates of SLR and allow for a wider range of adaptation options. For the first half of the 21st century differences in ESL events among the scenarios are small, facilitating adaptation planning. {,}

Non-climatic anthropogenic drivers will continue to increase the exposure and vulnerability of coastal communities to future SLR and ESL events in the absence of major adaptation efforts compared to today (high confidence). {4.3.4, Cross-Chapter Box 9}

The expected impacts of SLR on coastal ecosystems over the course of the century include habitat contraction, loss of functionality and biodiversity, and lateral and inland migration. Impacts will be exacerbated in cases of land reclamation and where anthropogenic barriers prevent inland migration of marshes and mangroves and limit the availability and relocation of sediment (high confidence). Under favourable conditions, marshes and mangroves have been found to keep pace with fast rates of SLR (e.g., >10 mm yr-1), but this capacity varies significantly depending on factors such as wave exposure of the location, tidal range, sediment trapping, overall sediment availability and coastal squeeze (high confidence). {}

In the absence of adaptation, more intense and frequent ESL events, together with trends in coastal development will increase expected annual flood damages by 2-3 orders of magnitude by 2100 (high confidence). However, well designed coastal protection is very effective in reducing expected damages and cost efficient for urban and densely populated regions, but generally unaffordable for rural and poorer areas (high confidence). Effective protection requires investments on the order of tens to several hundreds of billions of USD yr-1 globally (high confidence). While investments are generally cost efficient for densely populated and urban areas (high confidence), rural and poorer areas will be challenged to afford such investments with relative annual costs for some small island states amounting to several percent of GDP (high confidence). Even with well-designed hard protection, the risk of possibly disastrous consequences in the event of failure of defences remains. {4.3.4,,, Cross-Chapter Box 9}

Risk related to SLR (including erosion, flooding and salinisation) is expected to significantly increase by the end of this century along all low-lying coasts in the absence of major additional adaptation efforts (very high confidence). While only urban atoll islands and some Arctic communities are expected to experience moderate to high risk relative to today in a low emission pathway, almost high to very high risks are expected in all low-lying coastal settings at the upper end of the likely range for high emission pathways (medium confidence). However, the transition from moderate to high and from high to very high risk will vary from one coastal setting to another (high confidence). While a slower rate of SLR enables greater opportunities for adapting, adaptation benefits are also expected to vary between coastal settings. Although ambitious adaptation will not necessarily eradicate end-century SLR risk (medium confidence), it will help to buy time in many locations and therefore help to lay a robust foundation for adaptation beyond 2100. {4.1.3, 4.3.4, Box 4.1, SM4.2}

Choosing and Implementing Responses

All types of responses to SLR, including protection, accommodation, EbA, advance and retreat, have important and synergistic roles to play in an integrated and sequenced response to SLR (high confidence). Hard protection and advance (building into the sea) are economically efficient in most urban contexts facing land scarcity (high confidence), but can lead to increased exposure in the long term. Where sufficient space is available, EbA can both reduce coastal risks and provide multiple other benefits (medium confidence). Accommodation such as flood proofing buildings and EWS for ESL events are often both low-cost and highly cost-efficient in all contexts (high confidence). Where coastal risks are already high, and population size and density are low, or in the aftermath of a coastal disaster, retreat may be especially effective, albeit socially, culturally and politically challenging. {,,,,, 4.4.3}

Technical limits to hard protection are expected to be reached under high emission scenarios (RCP8.5) beyond 2100 (high confidence) and biophysical limits to EbA may arise during the 21st century, but economic and social barriers arise well before the end of the century (medium confidence). Economic challenges to hard protection increase with higher sea levels and will make adaptation unaffordable before technical limits are reached (high confidence). Drivers other than SLR are expected to contribute more to biophysical limits of EbA. For corals, limits may be reached during this century, due to ocean acidification and ocean warming, and for tidal wetlands due to pollution and infrastructure limiting their inland migration. Limits to accommodation are expected to occur well before limits to protection occur. Limits to retreat are uncertain, reflecting research gaps. Social barriers (including governance challenges) to adaptation are already encountered. {,,,,, 4.4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9}

Choosing and implementing responses to SLR presents society with profound governance challenges and difficult social choices, which are inherently political and value laden (high confidence). The large uncertainties about post 2050 SLR, and the substantial impact expected, challenge established planning and decision making practises and introduce the need for coordination within and between governance levels and policy domains. SLR responses also raise equity concerns about marginalising those most vulnerable and could potentially spark or compound social conflict (high confidence). Choosing and implementing responses is further challenged through a lack of resources, vexing trade-offs between safety, conservation and economic development, multiple ways of framing the ‘sea level rise problem’, power relations, and various coastal stakeholders having conflicting interests in the future development of heavily used coastal zones (high confidence). {4.4.2, 4.4.3}

Despite the large uncertainties about post 2050 SLR, adaptation decisions can be made now, facilitated by using decision analysis methods specifically designed to address uncertainty (high confidence). These methods favour flexible responses (i.e., those that can be adapted over time) and periodically adjusted decisions (i.e., adaptive decision making). They use robustness criteria (i.e., effectiveness across a range of circumstances) for evaluating alternative responses instead of standard expected utility criteria (high confidence). One example is adaptation pathway analysis, which has emerged as a low-cost tool to assess long-term coastal responses as sequences of adaptive decisions in the face of dynamic coastal risk characterised by deep uncertainty (medium evidence, high agreement). The range of SLR to be considered in decisions depends on the risk tolerance of stakeholders, with stakeholders whose risk tolerance is low also considering SLR higher than the likely range. {4.1,}

Adaptation experience to date demonstrates that using a locally appropriate combination of decision analysis, land use planning, public participation and conflict resolution approaches can help to address the governance challenges faced in responding to SLR (high confidence). Effective SLR responses depend, first, on taking a long-term perspective when making short-term decisions, explicitly accounting for uncertainty of locality-specific risks beyond 2050 (high confidence), and building governance capabilities to tackle the complexity of SLR risk (medium evidence, high agreement). Second, improved coordination of SLR responses across scales, sectors and policy domains can help to address SLR impacts and risk (high confidence). Third, prioritising consideration of social vulnerability and equity underpins efforts to promote fair and just climate resilience and sustainable development (high confidence) and can be helped by creating safe community arenas for meaningful public deliberation and conflict resolution (medium evidence, high agreement). Finally, public awareness and understanding about SLR risks and responses can be improved by drawing on local, indigenous and scientific knowledge systems, together with social learning about locality-specific SLR risk and response potential (high confidence). {, 4.4.5, Table 4.9}

Achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and charting Climate Resilient Development Pathways depends in part on ambitious and sustained mitigation efforts to contain SLR coupled with effective adaptation actions to reduce SLR impacts and risk (medium evidence, high agreement).

How is sea level rise related to climate change?

Californians living on the coast may be used to seeing so-called King Tides — a regular phenomenon where high tides are higher than normal on certain days of the year. Shown here: Embarcadero Waterfront in San Francisco, California. Image credit: Michael Filippoff

Many people are interested in climate change and how a changing climate will affect the ocean. With the majority of Americans living in coastal states, rising water levels can have potentially large impacts. Global tidal records from 1900 to 1990 show an estimated four to five inch rise in global mean sea level. Then, in the 25 years from 1990 to 2015, this global tide gauge network showed global sea level rising three inches, agreeing with measures by satellite altimeters taken since 1992. Currently, sea level is rising about one-eighth of an inch per year but is projected to rise in the future. By 2100, sea levels may rise another one to eight feet.

Sea level can rise by two different mechanisms with respect to climate change. First, as the oceans warm due to an increasing global temperature, seawater expands—taking up more space in the ocean basin and causing a rise in water level. The second mechanism is the melting of ice over land, which then adds water to the ocean.

Global sea level trends and relative sea level trends are different measurements. Just as the surface of the Earth is not flat, the surface of the ocean is also not flat—in other words, the sea surface is not changing at the same rate globally. Sea level rise at specific locations may be more or less than the global average due to many local factors: subsidence, upstream flood control, erosion, regional ocean currents, variations in land height, and whether the land is still rebounding from the compressive weight of Ice Age glaciers.

Sea level is primarily measured using tide stations and satellite laser altimeters. Tide stations around the globe tell us what is happening at a local level—the height of the water as measured along the coast relative to a specific point on land. Satellite measurements provide us with the average height of the entire ocean. Taken together, these tools tell us how our ocean sea levels are changing over time.

Sea Level Rise – an overview

2.1 Introduction

Sea-level rise (SLR) has been recognized as a major threat to low-lying coastal areas since the 1980s (e.g., Barth and Titus, 1984; Milliman et al., 1989; Tsyban et al., 1990). There is an ever growing literature demonstrating the large potential impacts of SLR. Hence, interest in coastal adaptation is also increasing (Linham and Nicholls, 2010; Moser et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2014). Although SLR only directly impacts coastal areas, these are the most densely-populated and economically active land areas on Earth. More than 600 million people live below 10 m elevation in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone (McGranahan et al., 2007; Neumann et al., 2015), and coastal urban areas are expanding rapidly (Hanson et al., 2011). These people and assets are exposed to multiple meteorological and geophysical hazards, including storms and storm-induced flooding (Kron, 2013). Many low-lying coastal areas already depend on various flood risk adaptation strategies, be it natural and/or artificial flood defences and drainage or flood resilient construction methods. Recent major events such as Hurricane Katrina, 2005 (New Orleans and environs, USA), Cyclone Nagris, 2008 (Irrawaddy delta, Myanmar), Superstorm Sandy, 2012 (New York and environs), Typhoon Haiyan, 2013 (the Philippines), or the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season in the Caribbean and US Gulf Coasts demonstrate the present vulnerability of low-lying coastal areas to floods during storms. SLR and potentially more intense storms have the potential to exacerbate these risks significantly unless we adapt (Wong et al., 2014). As well as the human environment, coastal areas also support important and productive ecosystems that are sensitive to SLR (Crossland et al., 2005).

This chapter focuses on adaptation to SLR. This can be defined as reducing the impacts of SLR via behavioral changes. This includes a range of actions from individuals/households to collective coastal management policy, such as upgraded defence systems, warning systems and land management approaches. SLR is a pervasive long-term problem that will continue for centuries. Hence, the chapter focuses on collective actions as only at this level of response can the long-term challenge of SLR be met. Coastal adaptation to SLR has been considered for the last 20–30 years (Barth and Titus, 1984; Dronkers et al., 1990; Bijlsma et al., 1996), building on the large experience of coastal adaptation to extremes and other stresses such as coastal subsidence. Despite this experience, uncertainties about the success or failure of adaptation to SLR remains large, contributing significant uncertainty to the overall consequences of SLR for society (Nicholls et al., 2014a; Nicholls, 2014). Hence, the chapter reviews and evaluates current efforts in coastal adaptation to SLR.

The chapter is structured as follows. First the coast as a system is elaborated. This provides an appropriate framework to analyze coasts, SLR and adaptation. Second, climate change and SLR are considered in more detail, including the important distinction between global-mean and relative SLR. Then the impacts of SLR are briefly considered from both a biophysical and a socioeconomic perspective, including drawing on experience from subsiding coasts. This is followed by a more detailed consideration of adaptation. This demonstrates the complexity of adaptation and the multiple factors that need to be considered. A discussion/conclusion ends the chapter, including consideration of success and failure and how can best practice be defined.

Sea level rise: causes and consequences

Is the planet in deep water? Metaphorically speaking, there may be disparate opinions: it is true that human action has caused havoc on the environment, in some cases with no possibility of turning back; but those who prefer to see the glass half full focus on the purpose of amendment and the progress made to reverse the situation.

However, we could assert that the planet is in deep water… or will be in the near future, as is clear from the latest announcement from NASA.

The US space agency released in August this year a study by his panel of scientists that reveals the alarming process of sea level rise: 8 centimeters in the last 23 years, no less. The most worrying aspect of this report, however, is not this increasing figure, but its foresight: “Sea level is rising faster than 50 years ago and is likely to worsen in the future.” What does this mean? By the end of this century the water could have invaded almost a meter on the mainland (up to 0.9 meters is the United Nations forecast).


Sea level rise: main causes

To find the source of this threat it is necessary to focus on global warming caused by climate change, which causes sea level rise in three different ways:

The first is the thermal expansion: water, when heated by temperature rise, tends to expand, ie, oceans take up more space.

In addition, the melting of the iced territories of Greenland and West Antarctica accelerates global warming. This process is negatively influenced by freshwater seepage from the surface, which acts as a lubricant for the ice streams and helps them to slide faster. That is, fresh filtered water to the base of the ice sheets melt, weaken and slide them into the sea.

Finally, in a similar type of process, large formations of ice in glaciers and ice caps melt and won’t then return to its original shape. Usually these gigantic frozen structures partially crumbled during the summer, but recovered its solid state when winter temperatures returned. Now, because of global warming, the snowfall is softer, winters delay and springs anticipate, so ice does not reattach in the same manner and amount.


Sea level rise: main consequences

The effects of sea level rise are already being felt, and the forecasts are not very hopeful. First, water is increasingly invading coastal areas, causing soil erosion and threatening farmland, housing or recreation areas. The flooding of wetlands and pollution of aquifers also occur, affecting the flora and fauna of each place, causing the loss of habitat for fish, birds, plants and many other species.

On the other hand, a higher sea level causes heavy rains and strong winds, unleashes severe storms and other big atmospheric phenomena that can be a real threat to places that might be on its way.

On the social aspect, the constant threat of sea level rise menaces hundreds of millions of people living in coastal communities. If water continues to rise, they will be forced to abandon their homes and move to another area, with the corresponding demographic problem. This is known as forced migration resulting from climate change.

Finally, low-lying islands would be swallowed by the oceans, leading to the disappearance of large land areas and even some countries.


Do you think we have time to stop the sea level rise? Tell us and participate in our poll.


Sources: Europa Press, National Geographic, The Climate Institute, Greenpeace and Ecologistas en Acción.

90,000 The “Copper Riot” began in Moscow

On July 25 (August 4), 1662, an uprising of the urban lower classes took place in Moscow, caused by the increase in taxes during the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667. and the issuance of discounted copper money.

Copper money, equal to the value of silver, began to be issued in large quantities from 1654 to cover military expenses. This led to the depreciation of money, a sharp rise in prices and the massive production of counterfeit coins. From the outbreak in the early 1660s.financial catastrophe suffered, first of all, the townspeople associated with small and medium trade, and service people who received a salary.

On the night of July 24-25 (August 3-4), 1662, thieves’ sheets were pasted in Moscow, in which the top of the ruling elite were declared traitors and the culprits of the financial crisis: the Miloslavsky boyars, the head of the Grand Palace order, okolnichy F.M. Rtishchev, head of the Armory Chamber okolnichy B. M. Khitrovo, clerk D. M. Bashmakov, guests V.G. Shorin, S. Zadorin and others.

Early in the morning of July 25 (August 4), an uprising began, in which from 9 to 10 thousand people took part. Active participants in the “Copper Riot” in 1662 were representatives of the city’s lower classes of the capital, nonresidents and peasants from the villages near Moscow, as well as soldiers (especially from Shepelev’s regiment), groups of dragoons from a number of regiments, and part of the archers. The rebels went to the village of Kolomenskoye, where Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was staying, and demanded the extradition of the “traitors.”

The Tsar and the boyars promised the rebels to reduce taxes and to investigate their petition.Believing the promises, the participants in the uprising headed for Moscow, but a new wave of rebels was already moving from there to Kolomenskoye. Two counter streams merged and moved towards the royal residence. They renewed their demands, threatening, if the boyars were not handed over to them for reprisal, to take them to the palace themselves.

The troops gathered in Kolomenskoye (from 6 to 10 thousand people) began massacring the rebels. As a result of the riot, up to 1,000 people were killed, hanged, drowned in the Moskva River, several thousand were arrested and exiled after the investigation.

The copper money that served as a direct reason for the revolt was abolished by the Tsar’s Decree of 1663

Lit .: Buganov V.I. Moscow uprising of 1662, M., 1964; The same [Electronic resource]. URL: http://www.bibliotekar.ru/Prometey-5/10.htm; The uprising of 1662 in Moscow: Sat. doc. M., 1964; Nazarov V.D.Moscow uprisings 1648, 1662 // Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 5.M., 1978. S. 416-417; The same [Electronic resource]. URL: http://militera.lib.ru/enc/enc1976/index.html.

See also in the Presidential Library:

Berkh V. N. The reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. SPb., 1831. Part 1. P. 48–50;

Kotoshikhin G. About Russia during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. SPb., 1884. Ch. 7, pp. 9, pp. 111-118;

Migulin P. P. Economic growth of the Russian state for 300 years (1613-1912). M., 1913.

90,000 Warsaw Uprising: Why Didn’t Stalin Help the Poles? | Culture and Lifestyle in Germany and Europe | DW

75 years ago, on August 1, 1944, the Warsaw Uprising began, organized by the Home Army command and representatives of the Polish government in exile.According to the conviction of the majority of Western historians, militarily and strategically, it was directed against the “Third Reich”, but politically – against the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht was retreating, the Red Army was advancing further and further to the West. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. It was clear that the armed forces of the Soviet Union would receive the entire territory of Poland under their control. The Poles, who had no particular sympathy for the USSR, decided to take the initiative into their own hands in order to free themselves from the German invaders. And at 5 pm on August 1, an armed uprising began in Warsaw.

Neither the Soviet side, nor Great Britain, nor the United States provided substantial support to the rebels. The Warsaw Uprising ended on October 2, 1944 with the surrender of the Polish side. In the course of actions aimed at suppressing the uprising, the Germans killed at least 150 thousand civilians in Warsaw and actually razed the once beautiful city in Europe to the ground: about 85 percent of the buildings were destroyed.

Surrender on October 2, 1944

In the historiography of the USSR and the Polish People’s Republic, all responsibility for the defeat was assigned to the émigré government and the command of the Home Army, who sought to seize power before the arrival of the Red Army.In turn, Western historians accused the Soviet command of deliberately evading aid to the Poles, but Soviet historians objected, citing the fact that, due to objective circumstances, it was impossible to provide assistance.

German historians on the Warsaw Uprising

So, who is right? And who is to blame for what? Let’s try to figure it out with the help of two German historians. DW’s questions were answered by Ekaterina Makhotina, Doctor of Historical Sciences, lecturer at the University of Bonn, and Jörg Ganzenmüller, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Chairman of the Board of the Ettersberg Foundation, Professor at the University of Jena.

DW: Is it possible to say that the uprising was initially doomed? After all, outside help, and it was objectively necessary, was not expected: no agreements were reached with Stalin, and the allies would hardly have supported the rebels in defiance of Stalin …

Ekaterina Makhotina: The decision to start the uprising was very quickly – as soon as the Red Army occupied Prague, one of the districts of Warsaw. The conflict between the Polish government in exile and Moscow was longstanding, and after the mass graves of Polish citizens in the Katyn Forest were found in 1943, the alliance came to an end.The offensive of the Red Army, the creation of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (Lublin Committee), whose members were to, in agreement with Moscow, become the basis of the post-war leadership in Poland – all this led to the decision to start the uprising. Among Polish historians there are those who consider the participants in the uprising to be martyrs for a just cause, and those who are sure that such a number of victims would have been avoided if the uprising had not taken place.

Jörg Ganzenmüller : Despite the difficult relationship, the Home Army and the Red Army liberated Vilnius from the Germans together, and this operation was crowned with success.However, experience has shown that when you release together, and not on your own, you can then be deprived of the right to vote. Therefore, the Home Army and the Polish government in exile were waiting for the right moment to begin the liberation of Warsaw on their own. Today it seems to us obvious that the uprising was doomed in the then balance of power. But then the participants in the events probably did not think so.

Polish and German historians today paint a picture of what was happening then as follows: the Red Army stood and did nothing, although it could help , and the British and Americans refused to help under the pressure of Stalin’s authority and according to Tehran agreements.

Ekaterina Makhotina: The rebels capitulated not only because they were not helped. There were many reasons: the incredible cruelty with which the Nazis dealt with the inhabitants of Warsaw, poorly developed communication and insufficient coordination of the actions of the insurgents, a lack of military equipment and ammunition and, of course, the lack of outside assistance. Stalin forbade American aircraft to land in the territory occupied by Soviet troops. Only on September 10, the Soviet leadership began to provide assistance and allowed the Allies to supply the rebels from the air.But this help at that time no longer made sense.

Jörg Ganzenmüller : Traditionally, there are two versions of those events. The first is especially popular in Poland. According to her, the refusal to provide assistance to the rebels was a deliberate political decision of the Soviet leadership, which allowed Stalin to weaken the position of his political competitors in Poland. The second version took root in the Soviet Union and is popular in Russia today. According to it, the forces and communications of the Red Army, which came close to Warsaw, were too scattered, and therefore it was not possible to quickly make up for losses in military equipment and personnel, that is, there were objective military-strategic reasons why the Red Army could not provide assistance to the insurgents.I suppose that the third version is objectively correct – some combination of these two options.

– How can you assess the results of the uprising?

Ekaterina Makhotina: A lot of people became victims, and the Polish capital became the city most severely damaged during the Second World War. When the Red Army entered Warsaw, the annihilation and destruction of civilians stopped, but over time, the Home Army was disbanded, and all the underground Polish anti-communist organizations ceased to exist.

Jörg Ganzenmüller : The rebels did not achieve either their political goals or their military-strategic goals. However, the symbolic meaning of the Warsaw Uprising is still relevant in Poland.

– If the uprising had not taken place, would the Germans still, retreating, raze Warsaw to the ground? What was the point of in such a ruthless destruction of the city and in such a brutal reprisal against its civilians ?

Ekaterina Makhotina: It should be emphasized that the capture of Polish territories by German troops from the very beginning of the war was associated with incredible cruelty.And the destruction of civilians was often interpreted as a kind of “act of retaliation.” For Hitler, Poles were “subhuman”, and the campaign he launched in 1939 was a war of annihilation, one of the specific features of which was the “scorched earth” tactic.

Jörg Ganzenmüller : This was a deliberately executed punitive action. The Nazis believed that the Polish people, in principle, were not capable and certainly did not have the right to independence and make independent decisions, and the rebels clearly demonstrated that this was not so and that the Poles were ready and would fight.That is why the Germans, having destroyed Warsaw, “pointed out” to Poland that it is not an independent state and, in principle, is not capable of being one.

Monument to the participants in the Warsaw Uprising

– Can we say that such a different attitude Western and Soviet (and Russian) historians to the Warsaw Uprising – is a typical example of how history interpreted for the sake of political doctrine?

Jörg Ganzenmüller : Two different versions of those events appeared already in the mid-1940s.And since then, nothing has changed. Although, of course, we must not forget that in Poland, in fact, until the mid-1980s or even the early 1990s, it was impossible to speak of the uprising as a heroic page of Polish history.

Ekaterina Makhotina: The Warsaw Uprising has always been used by politicians. In one version – for the sacralization of the nation, in the other – to strengthen the communist ideology. Etc.
Today, the anti-communist character of the uprising is the foundation on which the national-conservative political establishment rests.And in Russia, the contribution of the Red Army to the liberation of Europe (and, in particular, Poland) is a basic element of the official culture of memory.

See also:

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how it ended


    Joachim von Ribbentrop (left), Joseph Stalin (second from left) and Vyacheslav Molotov (signs, sits on the right). On the part of the USSR, the treaty was signed by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, and on the part of Germany, by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop.The agreement is often referred to as the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how ended

    Molotov and Hitler

    The parties to the agreement pledged to refrain from attacking each other and to maintain neutrality if one of them became the object of hostilities by a third party. Attached to the treaty was a secret additional protocol on the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. Molotov paid a return visit to Berlin.In the picture he is on the left with Hitler and the translator.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how did it end

    Hitler on the pact and Stalin’s position

    “Our enemies hoped that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland … I was convinced that Stalin would never will accept the British proposals.Only reckless optimists could think that Stalin was so stupid that he did not recognize their true purpose.Russia is not interested in preserving Poland … Now… the way is open for the soldiers “, – Adolf Hitler (1939).

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how did it end

    ” A treacherous monster “by the name of Hitler

    ” … government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there not a mistake on the part of the Soviet government here? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a pact of peace between two states “, – from Stalin’s speech (1941, after Hitler’s attack on the USSR).

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how did it end


    The treaty was signed after a period of very serious cooling of Soviet-German relations caused by Hitler’s coming to power and armed conflicts in which the USSR opposed the Hitler coalition: Germany and Italy in Spain, Japan in the Far East. The agreement came as a surprise not only to third countries, but also to the population of the USSR and Germany.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how it ended


    On September 1, 1939, Germany launched an invasion of Poland, and on September 17, 1939, Soviet troops entered Poland.The territorial division of the country was completed on September 28, 1939 with the signing of a friendship and border agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. Later, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, as well as part of Finland were annexed to the USSR.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how friendship began and ended

    The beginning of World War II

    The Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht was a military operation, as a result of which the territory of Poland was completely occupied, and its parts were annexed by the “Third Reich” and the USSR.In response to Hitler’s aggression, Britain and France declared war on Germany, which marked the beginning of World War II. September 1, 1939, the day of the invasion of Poland, is considered to be its date.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how it ended

    Partition of Poland

    German troops defeated the armed forces of Poland. On September 17, Soviet troops entered the territory of Poland – as officially reported, with the aim of annexing Western Belarus and Western Ukraine to the USSR.The territory of Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union in accordance with secret protocols to non-aggression and friendship and border treaties, as well as Lithuania and Slovakia.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and ended

    Joint parade in Brest

    On September 14, 1939, the German 19th Motorized Corps attacked Brest-on-Bug (then a Polish city) and occupied it. On September 22, Brest was handed over to the 29th Tank Brigade of the Red Army during an impromptu parade.The parade is received: in the center – General Guderian (commander of the 19th motorized corps), on the right – the commander of the 29th light tank brigade of the Red Army, brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how it ended

    Symbol city

    The city of Brest became part of the USSR as the center of the newly formed Brest region of the Byelorussian SSR. The Soviet-German demarcation line ran along the Western Bug River. And it was this city that was one of the first to be attacked by German troops on June 22, 1941.The defense of the Brest Fortress became a symbol of fortitude, courage and military valor. The photo shows a parade during the transfer of the city to the Red Army in 1939.

  • Stalin and Hitler: how the friendship began and how it ended

    How the friendship ended

    After the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, like all other Soviet-German treaties, lost strength. In 1989, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR condemned the secret additional protocol to the treaty and declared it invalid from the moment of signing.Today 23 August is the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism.

    Author: Daria Bryantseva


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Tambov (Antonov) peasant uprising: the historical truth of Russia from the RVIO


The main reason for the uprising was the “military-communist” policy of surplus appropriation carried out by the Bolsheviks in the countryside during the Civil War.That is, the forcible expropriation of bread and other foodstuffs from the peasants, which are necessary for the existence of the Red Army and the urban population, with the help of the armed force (food detachments). This policy was accompanied by the mobilization of peasants for military service, various kinds of duties (labor, horse-drawn, etc.). The grain Tambov province experienced the full brunt of the surplus appropriation. By October 1918, 50 food detachments from Petrograd, Moscow and other cities, numbering up to 5 thousand people, were operating in the province.Not a single province had ever known such a scale of confiscations. After the bread was raked out clean, it often disappeared on the spot: it rotted at the nearest railway stations, was drunk by food detachments, distilled into moonshine. Peasants everywhere were forced to choose between resistance and death by starvation. Added to this was the robbery and closure of churches, which forced the patriarchal Orthodox peasantry to defend their shrines.

The first and most massive form of resistance to the surplus appropriation system was the reduction by the peasant of his farm.If in 1918 in the black earth and “grain” of the Tambov province, one farm accounted for an average of 4.3 tithes of sowing, then in 1920 – 2.8 tithes. The fields were sown in the size required only for personal consumption.

The situation in the village deteriorated especially sharply in 1920, when the Tambov region was hit by a drought, and the surplus appropriation remained extremely high. According to VA Antonov-Ovseenko, one of the organizers of the suppression of the uprising, the peasantry fell into complete decline, and in a number of districts of the Tambov province, residents “ate not only chaff, swan, but also bark, nettles.”

The uprising broke out spontaneously in mid-August 1920 in the villages of Khitrovo and Kamenka, Tambov district, where the peasants refused to hand over their grain and disarmed the food detachment. Within a month, popular indignation gripped several districts of the province, the number of insurgents reached 4 thousand armed insurgents and about 10 thousand people with pitchforks and scythes. On the territory of the Kirsanovsky, Borisoglebsky and Tambov districts, a kind of “peasant republic” was formed with the center in the village of Kamenka.

The uprising was led by a tradesman of the city of Kirsanov, a former volost clerk and people’s teacher, Left Socialist-Revolutionary Alexander Stepanovich Antonov (1889–1922).In his biography there was a fighting Socialist-Revolutionary past, imprisonment during the years of tsarism, commanding over the militia of the Kirsanovsky district after the February Revolution. He voluntarily left the post of chief of the district militia due to rejection of the communist dictatorship and the government’s policy towards the peasantry. In the fall of 1918 Antonov formed a “fighting squad” and began an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks. His detachment became the organizational nucleus of the partisan army.

Under Antonov’s command, the rebel forces grew rapidly.This was facilitated by the clarity of the goals of the uprising (the slogans of death to the communists and a free peasant republic), successful military operations in favorable geographic conditions (a large number of forests and other natural shelters), flexible partisan tactics of surprise attacks and rapid withdrawal. In February 1921, when the insurrectionary movement reached its peak, the number of soldiers reached 40 thousand people, the army was divided into 21 regiments and a separate brigade. The rebels smashed state farms and communes, damaged railways.The uprising began to go beyond the local framework, finding a response in the border districts of the neighboring Voronezh and Saratov provinces.

Moscow was forced to pay the most serious attention to this uprising. In late February – early March 1921, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was formed, headed by V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, which concentrated all power in the Tambov province in its hands. Large military contingents, equipment, including artillery, armored parts and aircraft, were removed from the fronts that ended hostilities.The entire province was divided into six combat areas with field headquarters and emergency authorities – political commissions.

Without waiting for the decisions of the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) to replace the food appropriation system with a tax in kind, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on February 2, 1921 instructed NI Bukharin, Ye. A. Preobrazhensky and LB Kamenev “to develop and approve the text of the appeal .. . to the peasants of the Tambov province in order to distribute it only in this province, without publishing it in newspapers. ” The appeal, which announced the abolition of food appropriation and the permission of the local trade exchange of agricultural products, began to be distributed as early as February 9.

On April 27, 1921, at the suggestion of Lenin, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a resolution “On the elimination of Antonov’s gangs in the Tambov province”, according to which MN Tukhachevsky was appointed commander of the operation. Together with him, the famous military leaders N.E. Kakurin, I.P. Uborevich, G.I.Kotovsky arrived in the Tambov region. G.G. Yagoda, V.V.Ulrikh, Ya.A. Levin were sent from the punitive bodies. The number of Red Army soldiers was increased to 100 thousand people.

The military defeat of the so-called antonism began.A brutal military occupation of the insurgent areas was carried out, the destruction of households and the destruction of the homes of the participants in the rebellion and their families, the taking of hostages, including from among children, the creation of concentration camps and repression up to execution for disobedience, for harboring “bandits” and weapons, that is … the terror of the civilian population was organized. During the suppression of the uprising, Tukhachevsky destroyed many villages and villages with the use of artillery, armored vehicles and poisonous gases.

In the summer of 1921, Antonov’s main forces were defeated.In late June – early July, they issued the last order, according to which the combat detachments were asked to divide into groups and hide in the forests. The uprising disintegrated into isolated pockets, which were to be liquidated by the end of the year. Antonov and his group were destroyed in June 1922.

Encyclopedia “Around the World”



Order of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the start of holding

repressive measures against individual bandits and their families

N 171, g.Tambov

June 11, 1921

For political commissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Starting from June 1, decisive struggle against banditry gives

Fast settling of the edge. Soviet power successively

is being restored, and the laboring peasantry

goes to peaceful and quiet work.

Antonov’s gang was defeated by the decisive actions of our troops,

scattered and caught one by one.

In order to finally eradicate the SR-bandit roots and

in addition to previously issued orders Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee


1.Citizens who refuse to give their names should be shot on the spot

without trial.

2. Settlements in which weapons are hidden, by the authority of the political commission or

District Political Commission to announce the hostage sentence

and shoot those in case of failure to surrender weapons.

3. If a hidden weapon is found, shoot on the spot

without trial, the senior worker in the family.

4. The family in whose house the bandit took refuge is subject to arrest

and expulsion from the province, her property is confiscated, senior employee

in this family is shot without trial.

5. Families harboring family members or bandits’ property,

treated as bandits, and senior worker of this family

to be shot on the spot without trial.

6. In the event of the flight of the bandit’s family, distribute the property between

peasants loyal to Soviet power, and burned the abandoned houses

or disassemble.

7. This order should be enforced severely and mercilessly.

Chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Antonov-Ovseenko

Commander of the troops Tukhachevsky

Chairman of the Provincial Executive Committee Lavrov

Secretary Vasiliev

Read at village gatherings.

GATO. F.R.-4049. Op. 1. D.5. L. 45. Typographic copy.

Peasant uprising in the Tambov province in 1919-1921, “Antonovshchina”: documents and materials.



By mid-January 1921, the organization of the uprising took shape. In five counties, up to 900 village committees were created, elected by gatherings, united by volost, then district, district and, finally, provincial committees of the Labor Peasant Unions (STK).The Armed Forces of A.S. Antonov combined the principles of building a regular army (2 armies consisting of 21 regiments, a separate brigade) with irregular armed detachments. Particular attention was paid to the organization of political, propaganda work among the peasants. The army had a network of political agencies that absorbed the fragments of the defeated Socialist-Revolutionary organizations. The agitation was of a simplified nature (mainly slogans like “Death to the Communists!” And “Long live the working peasantry!”leaflet STK “Why the Bolsheviks will not be able to defeat Antonov”).

The main task of the STK set “the overthrow of the power of the Communist Bolsheviks, who brought the country to poverty, death and shame.” Among the political goals in the STK Program were the equality of all citizens without division into classes (in one of the variants – “excluding the house of the Romanovs”). The convocation of the Constituent Assembly was supposed to “establish a new political system”, and before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the creation of temporary power “on an elective basis”, but without the Bolsheviks.Some representatives of the STK supplemented this program with such requirements as the declaration of an “end to the civil war” as the goal of the “armed struggle”, as well as “the emancipation of people and horses in the name of equality, brotherhood and freedom.”

The economic program coincided with the program recommended by the letter of the Central Committee of the AKP of May 13, 1920. It included the partial denationalization of industry, leaving “in the hands of the state” large-scale industry, especially coal and metallurgy; “workers’ control and state supervision over production”; “the full implementation of the law on the socialization of the land.””Free production” was proclaimed in the handicraft industry; the supply of food and other basic necessities to “the population of town and country through cooperatives”; “regulation of prices for labor and products of production” in state industry; “admission of Russian and foreign capital” for the restoration of economic life. (We will see later these ideas at the heart of the Bolshevik NEP, it was another interception of the Socialist-Revolutionary slogans by the “party of power”, as in 1917.)

Analysis of the structure and activities of the STK shows their democratic nature, both in terms of the method of election and composition.Even the KGB reports do not deny the benevolent attitude of the peasantry to the STK as the future organs of democracy. In the very structure of the STK, elements of the future party are guessed (centralism, meetings of supporters of the STK, possibly membership in them). The JCC Committee performs the main functions of a government body. In the military field, he organizes replenishment of volunteers, organizes the collection of money, food and clothing for the partisans, organizes medical assistance for them and assistance to their families. Through the “commandant’s office” he is in charge of quartering the rebels, changing horses, organizing communications and reconnaissance.

In support of the Committee, in order to fight the small parties of the “red”, a “vokhra” (internal security in the amount of 5 to 50 people per village) is organized. The JCC Committee also carries out general business and administrative work. Many decisions and actions of the STK are copied by the Soviet ones: political commissars and political departments in units and formations of A. Antonov’s army, the strictest “accounting and control”, severe punishments for offenses “according to the laws of revolutionary times.” The similarities in the organization and ideology of the opposing revolutionary forces manifested themselves in many ways, up to the conversion of “comrade” and the red banner.(From the interrogations of the Antonovites, the winged expression of our organs went – “the Tambov wolf is your comrade!”)

People who were psychologically ready for self-sacrifice were required to lead the insurgency. These features were endowed with the main leaders of the Tambov uprising of 1920-1921. A.S.Antonov, A.E. Ishin, G.N.Pluzhnikov, who came out “from the bottom” and gave themselves entirely to the revolution. Antonov himself was a man of immediate, “direct action,” ready to commit both “terrorist acts” and “exes” for the sake of high ideals.Antonov’s combat Socialist-Revolutionary past helped him become the head of the militia of the Kirsanovsky district. He had to fight the “agrarian terror”, to disarm the echelons of Czechoslovak troops passing through Kirsanov in May 1918. Perhaps this weapon came in handy later, but according to another version, Antonov was armed by Moscow, which was looking for support in the local police against the disloyal leadership of the province.

The specificity of the goals, as well as the victorious results of the actions, increased the morale of the “People’s Army” and attracted new forces to it.Numbered regiments for the entire time were created up to the 21st and, in addition, Antonov was constantly accompanied by a “special regiment” and personal security – “Parevskaya hundred”. The number of fighters reached in February 1920. up to 40,000, of which a significant part is from the fronts of the imperialist and civil war. In addition to the “field” troops, units of the “Vokhra” numbering up to 10,000 people also operated.

But this was the limit of the growth of the uprising. By the beginning of May, the number of “Antonovites” had decreased to 21 thousand, both as a result of the decisive actions of the Red Army that had begun, and in connection with the abolition of the surplus appropriation system.But the main reason was the onset of the spring harvest: the rebels, almost without exception, were from local peasants. On the “Two-week voluntary appearance of bandits”, which fell at the end of March-beginning of April (the period of preparation for field work), up to 6 thousand Antonovites appeared and dispersed to their homes. All ordinary participants were released (even though very few of them surrendered their weapons), and the “organizers” received reduced punishment.

Yu. Solozobov. The Tambov wolf is your citizen! Lessons from the Tambov uprising.



A crow barks on an oak tree –

Communist! Cock the hammer!

At the last hour, funeral,

Let’s take a walk once.

Eh share-week, a dry prison,

Valley, aspen, dark grave.

A crow barks on the oak –

Communist! Fire! Fire!

At the last hour, funeral

Moonshine smells like a corpse.

Original fragment of the song of the participants in the peasant uprising of the 1920s.20th century in the Tambov region (“Antonovtsev”). Heard by Mark Sobol in the mid-30s.

June Uprising of 1848


Related projects:
WAR OF 1812

June Uprising of 1848

JUNE UPRISING of 1848 – massive armed uprising of the Parisian
workers (June 23-26), “the first great civil war between the proletariat and
bourgeoisie “( Lenin V.I., Soch., 4th ed., T. 29, p. 283 ), largest event
bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848 in France . The uprising has appeared
a response to the onset of bourgeois reaction against democratic rights and freedoms,
conquered by the working people as a result of the February Revolution of 1848. June
the uprising in Paris was preceded by the uprisings in Rouen, Elboeuf and Limoges (at the end
April), a demonstration on May 15 in Paris, an uprising on June 22-23 in Marseille and
some other folk performances.The immediate reason for the uprising in
Paris was served by the decision of the Executive Commission to proceed with the expulsion in
the province of workers employed in national workshops that were organized
for the unemployed and numbered at that time over 100 thousand people (this mass
people, many of whom had weapons, instilled fear in the bourgeoisie and the government).
The provocative actions of the government caused huge outrage among the workers.
On June 22, columns of demonstrators marched through the streets of Paris, shouting “We are not
let’s leave! ”,“ Down with the constituent assembly! ”.From the morning of June 23 on the streets of the city
the construction of barricades began (about 600 in total). The uprising engulfed the workers
quarters of the eastern and northeastern parts of Paris, as well as its suburbs –
Montmartre, La Chapelle, La Villette, Belleville, Temple, Menilmontand, Ivry and some
other. The total number of the rebels was 40-45 thousand people (according to others
data – about 60 thousand people). The leadership of the armed struggle was carried out
“Foremen” and “delegates” of national workshops, leaders of political clubs,
commanders of detachments of the national guard of workers’ suburbs and suburbs (Rakari,
Barthélemy, Pelleu, Cournet, Pujol, Ibruy, Legenissel, Desteract, Delacolonge and
dr.). However, a unified governing center was not created. Communication between squads
the insurgents of various quarters proved to be completely inadequate. As a consequence
this failed to carry out the general plan of offensive actions from the workers
neighborhoods in the city center, designed by a former officer
I.R. Kersosi .

The general slogan of the uprising was “Long live the democratic and
social republic! ” With these words, the participants in the uprising expressed their
the desire to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and establish the rule of the working people.List
members of the new government, drawn up in case of the victory of the June Uprising,
included the names O. Blanca , F.V. Raspail,
A. Barbesa , A. Albert and some
other prominent revolutionaries who were at that time in prison. Scared
the scale of the June uprising, the bourgeois Constituent Assembly presented on June 24
dictatorial power to the Minister of War General
L.E. Cavaignac . From the province to
Detachments of troops were summoned to Paris, the arrival of which gave the government a huge
the preponderance of forces over the insurgent workers.June 26, after a 4-day hero
resistance, the June uprising was suppressed.

One of the main reasons for the defeat of the June Uprising was that
peasantry, urban, petty bourgeoisie, deceived by the anti-communist
propaganda, did not support the revolutionary workers of Paris. Only in some
large industrial cities (Amiens, Dijon, Bordeaux, etc.)
demonstrations of workers’ solidarity with the capital’s proletarians, dispersed
government troops. K.Marks and
F. Engels defended the June
insurgents, publishing in the “New Rhine Gazette” articles in which
the slanderous fabrications of the reactionary press were exposed and
the enormous historical significance of the June Uprising.

The suppression of the June Uprising was accompanied by mass arrests (about 25
thousand people), executions of prisoners, deportation without trial of more than 3500 people,
disarming the population of the workers’ quarters of Paris and other cities. Consequence
this was a sharp increase in bourgeois reaction and, ultimately, the death of the Second
republics, the establishment of a Bonapartist dictatorship in France (1851).The defeat of the June Uprising contributed to the strengthening of the counter-revolution in a number of other

Bourgeois historiography either completely ignores or grossly perverts
events of the June Uprising, repeating the slanderous fabrications of the reactionary
press of 1848 about the June rebels. An example of gross falsification of history
The June uprising can be served primarily by the book “History of the Second
republic “, belonging to the pen of the monarchist and cleric Pierre de la Gorsa (Pierre
de la Gorce, Histoire de la Seconde république française, t.1-2, P., 1887; ten
éd., P., 1925). In an extremely hostile tone he wrote about the June Uprising and
bourgeois republican, former member of the Provisional Government and Executive
Commission of 1848 L. Garnier-Pages , claiming that the June Uprising was
caused by the intrigues of the Bonapartist and Legitimist conspirators (L. A.
Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, t. 9-11, P., 1861-72).
The bourgeois historian General Ibo released a special work praising the executioner
June rebels, General Cavaignac, who considers him a “model” worthy of
imitation in our time (R.E. M. Ibos, Le général Cavaignac, un dictateur
républicain, P., 1930). Some modern bourgeois historians
depict the June Uprising as a spontaneous hunger riot (Ch. Schmidt, Les
journées de juin 1848, P. 1926; same, Des ateliers nationaux aux barricades
de juin, P., 1948).

The first true work on the June Uprising, published in France,
was a book by the revolutionary democratic publicist and poet L. Menard (L.
Ménard, Prologue d’une révolution, P., 1849), which contained a bright,
a historical essay full of facts, exposing the executioners of the revolted workers.Exposing the politics of the bourgeois republicans of the right wing, their bloody
the reprisals against the insurgent workers are devoted to the books of the petty-bourgeois publicist I.
Castia (H. Castille, Les massacres de juin 1848, P., 1869) and the socialist O.
Vermorel (Aug. Vermorel, Les hommes de 1848, P., 1869).

The Paris Commune of 1871 increased interest in the history of the June Uprising,
which began to be considered in democratic and socialist historiography
as a harbinger of the Commune.In 1880, a brochure by V. Maruk, an employee of
Gedist newspaper “Égalité”, dedicated to the June Uprising (V. Marouck, Les
grandes dates du socialisme. Juin 1848, P., 1880). Among the works of French
historians-Marxists are of particular value for the study of the June Uprising
article by E. Tersan “June 1848” (E. Tersen, Juin 48, “La Pensée”, 1948, No 19).

One of the first Soviet studies on the June Uprising was
A. I. Molok’s book “K. Marx and the June uprising, published in 1934
1848 in Paris “.In 1948, N. Ye. Zastenker’s books were published (“The Revolution of 1848
in France “) and A. I. Molok (” June days of 1848 in Paris “), as well as a number of
articles on these issues. A significant place is given to the June Uprising in
collective work “Revolutions 1848-1849”, published by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
under the editorship of F.V. Potemkin and A.I. Molok (v. 1-2, M., 1952).

A.I. Molok. Moscow.

Soviet Historical Encyclopedia. In 16 volumes. – M .: Soviet
encyclopedia.1973-1982. Volume 6. INDRA – KARAKAS. 1965.

Read more:

Major events of the XIX
(chronological table).

France in the XIX
(chronological table).

Historical persons of France (biographical


K. Marx, June Revolution, K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., Vol. 5; his
same, Claes. struggle in France, from 1848 to 1850, ibid., vol. 7; Engels F.,
Details of the events of 23 June, ibid., Vol. 5; his, June 23, in the same place; him,
June Revolution (The course of the uprising in Paris), ibid; Lenin V.I., From which
class. sources come and “come” Cavaignacs ?, Op., 4th ed., v. 25; him,
State and Revolution, Ch. 2, ibid; Herzen A.I., From the other side, Sobr. cit., t.
6, M., 1955; his, Past and Thoughts, Part 5, ibid., vol. 10, Moscow, 1956; Revolution of 1848
years in France in the memoirs of participants and contemporaries, M.-L., 1934; Bourgen
J., Repression after the June days, in the book.: “Reports and messages of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences
USSR “, V. 11, M., 1956; Molok A. I., Nek-ry questions of the history of the June uprising
1848 in Paris, “VI”, 1952, No 12; his, From the unpublished documents of June
uprising of the Parisian workers, in the book: From the history of socio-political. ideas. Sat. Art.
to the 75th anniversary of V.P. Volgin, M., 1955.

90,000 Publications / Research – Memorial Museum

V. Boyko

Chainskoe peasant uprising

Summer 1931

At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet government faced difficulties in procurement of agricultural products.This led to interruptions in the provision of food for the urban population, in the fulfillment of obligations to supply food abroad. The country’s political leadership was faced with a choice of ways of cooperation with the peasantry. One of them assumed the orientation of industry towards the production of goods for the countryside, an increase in the purchase prices for foodstuffs, a guarantee of the inviolability of the peasants’ ownership of land, property and the profit received from them. The second path was a forceful, military-police solution to the agrarian problem and, instead of economic incentives, assumed non-economic coercion and terror.

This is exactly what they did to the Russian peasantry. Through collectivization, he was robbed, having received a lump sum of much more products than they had received before, which were immediately sent to the needs of industrialization abroad. Moreover, the robbery was accompanied by violence – the whole policy was aimed at destroying the peasantry as an estate, as a bearer of certain moral principles and independent judgments. The choice of means for the implementation of this action was practically unlimited.Here and the artificially induced mass famine, which claimed millions of lives, and no less brutal mass eviction of peasants to undeveloped regions of the country and the little-known activity of the OGPU “troikas” in 1929-1931.

This article attempts to highlight one of the unknown pages in the history of the Siberian peasantry – the history of the Chainsky uprising in 1931. Only A. Malkov’s article appeared in the periodicals on this topic.

Preparation and course of the uprising

The main sources on the history of the uprising itself are the cases against F.R. Slavnikov, B. S. Bityukov and others in the amount of 135 people under Art. 58-2 of the Criminal Code, stored in the Tomsk KGB, and notes that came to the Galkin commandant I.B. Malyshkin during the suppression of the uprising. Additional information is contained in the memoirs of eyewitnesses of those events and some materials from the Chainsky archive of the regional executive committee. Unfortunately, these sources provide incomplete, sometimes fragmentary information on the history of the uprising.

According to I.B. Malyshkin, 18 thousandpeople, 700 horses, there were no other livestock. The area where the settlers were taken out was a continuous burnt-out area, that is, a burnt-out taiga with rotten dead wood, stumps and small bushes. “The settlers settled in the villages,” writes Malyshkin, “at first began to resist, to grumble at the Soviet power. It is quite understandable why; over the years they were removed from their homes and thrown into the wilderness, into the taiga. ”

A similar situation was in the neighboring Parbig commandant’s office. True, the situation there was aggravated by the fact that twice as many settlers were brought there, and the conditions there were worse than in the Galkin commandant’s office.Therefore, thoughts of resistance, unwillingness to live in places of settlement arose in people from the very beginning of their establishment in new places. The settlers also had a desire to free themselves as a result of the cruel treatment of them by the officers of the commandant’s offices. P.V., who now lives in Tomsk. Putilov told me about the senior shooter Ermakov, who through blackmail raped the settlement girls and women, about the huge and terrible watchman Zhuiko, who did not part with a belt whip and openly mocked the settlers swollen from hunger.The peasants were brought to a slave, serf state. P.V. Putilov said that an old settler fell to his knees and begged commandant Markin, a Bolshevik with pre-revolutionary experience, for forgiveness when he was caught on the road outside the village. Then, when he was taken to the post office, where he was going, and released, he again fell to his knees and, with tears in his eyes, thanked him for not being sent to prison.

The indictment in the case, although drawn up with gross errors, gives some idea of ​​the preparation of the uprising.The investigators of the OGPU (A. Malkov cited their names in his article) not without reason consider the “former owner of brick factories Georgy Yegorovich Uskov” to be the inspiration behind the uprising. In a few words, two inexcusable inaccuracies for the investigation; Uskov’s name was not Georgy, but Grigory; he did not have brick factories – it was worth looking into the case on which the conclusion was given, the interrogation protocols of his 65-year-old father, his wife and 16-year-old son.

Apparently, he possessed an extraordinary mind, could inspire the confidence of his superiors and local residents.At the same time, as his wife characterizes, Grigory Uskov was “a cunning and careful man, you will never get underneath him.” It was he, G. Ye. Uskov, and his fellow villager A. I. Medvedev “who began conversations about small rations, hard life,” etc. other areas. About 50 people attended. They decided to send the walkers to the region with a request for an increase in the ration, because otherwise all will inevitably die.If the edge fails, then something needs to be done. It was decided to raise funds to send the delegation.

It is quite possible to agree with these conclusions of the investigation team, but it is not clear how much the testimony of the main accused – Slavnikov Fyodor Rodionovich – was softened. In 1931 he was 60 years old, he arrived at the settlement from the Prokopyevsky district with his wife and 4 daughters.

This venerable head of the family showed that a month before the uprising Uskov had told him that the meeting should be held under the slogan: “Down with communism, long live free labor, free trade, freedom of speech and press and the right to land.”Probably, it was in the interests of the investigation to hide the seriousness of the preparation of the uprising, the political nature of the slogans put forward, since this would indicate the poor work of the commandant’s offices and secret services of the OGPU.

After 5 days, on July 8, a new meeting was held. There were about 50 people present, and, as Slavnikov says, “the men were chosen to raise the uprising.” Andrei Ivanovich Medvedev and Polikarp Naumovich Kolmogorov were sent to districts other than Leninsky. Slavnikov himself was sent to the 5th district on Galka.There he held several meetings in and near the village of Istomino. The peasants there declared that they were ready to speak out against the Soviet power, but support was needed. Slavnikov promised them help, said that in Novosibirsk, Tomsk and other cities, intensive work was being done to overthrow the Soviet regime. He told them that “Soviet power should not exist, but there should be a Constituent Assembly, which will elect the President and he will give freedom to the people …”. In response, the peasants agreed with Slavnikov and began to discuss the question of how to start the uprising.The plan of the Istominsk peasants included the seizure of the Oryol commandant’s office, and then the capture of Bakchar, where, according to the settlers, the main warehouses of the combine, that is, the commandant’s office, were located, and then move to Krylovka and Vysoky Yar. After that, it was planned to capture Podgornoye and Parabel and start moving to Novosibirsk.

During the meetings, the date of the general speech was determined – August 1, 1931.However, at the meeting on July 28 in Leninsky settlement, where, according to the information of the Chekists, local kerzhaks were also present, G.Uskov said that “there is a sense of failure in the work, you cannot wait until August 1,” and therefore the performance was scheduled for July 29.

P. Ya. Chernyshev was expelled from the Belovsky district. From 1915 to 1917 he served in the tsarist army, then from 1918 to 1922 – in the Red Army. Together with him, his 3 daughters and a two-year-old son were deported. Chernyshev conveys well the speech of the leader of the uprising G. Uskov, the actions of the rebels on July 29, 1931. In the morning, about 100 people gathered from the tents in Leninsky to perform.They were very weakly armed – axes, pitchforks, scythes, several Berdans. Uskov addressed them with the following words: “Citizens, the uprising broke out everywhere, you and I were one day late. Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Kuznetsk have already been taken. I have been sent here by the leaders of this rebellion to lead. Here are my documents (and here, according to Chernyshev, he shows some forms). About 200 people die without a fight every day, well, what if we lose 10 – 15 people in battle, but we all free ourselves. No need to coward. “In addition, in his speech G. Uskov urged not to kill anyone, but only to detain and take away weapons.

In the middle of the day, the rebels moved to Orlovka, where the district commandant’s office was located. However, their forces were still small and the offensive was repulsed. The losses of the rebels – 3 people, among the defenders one watchman was killed. His name is still unknown to us. In total, during the uprising, 4 representatives of the authorities were killed: a young land surveyor from Bakchar P. Khomutsky, chairman of the Vysokoyarsky village council G.Pazderin, an authorized Siblag Kudasov who lived in Bundyur, and a watchman, whose name is not given in the investigative documents.

The rebels under the command of G. Uskov seized the commandant’s offices in the villages of Krylovka and Parbig more successfully and bloodlessly. The commandant of Krylovka Belkin fled from the rebels to the taiga, and his subordinates were arrested. Soon Belkin headed one and three party detachments, which actively pursued the remnants of the rebel troops. The commandant of the Parbig commandant’s office, a 25-year-old member of the CPSU (b) N.I. Petrov was arrested on July 30 at his apartment by the rebels led by Uskov. Together with his assistant Nazarov, he sat first under guard in Istomin, and then in the Bundyur school. In addition to them, there were the secretary of the Bakcharsky village council Devyatov, the watchman Minov, the assistant to Belkin Prokopenko, the commandant of the 14th precinct Maksimov and others, a total of 8 people. None of them were shot.

Some representatives of the authorities sympathized with the uprising. Nestor Korovin, chairman of the Tiginsky village council, who had previously served in the Red Army for three years, betrayed G.Uskov 30 blank forms with a seal and a stamp. As it turned out, he did it not disinterestedly and for all together he received 5 years of concentration camps.

G. Uskov’s father showed the investigator that the secretary of the village council Ivan Yakovlevich often came to his son, he does not know his last name. The investigation established that it was I. Ya. Lebedev, who arrived in the Bakcharsky district from the Botkin district in the Urals in 1929 voluntarily. He lived in the village. Kivar, had a hut, one horse, one cow, crops on 0.6 hectares. His family had 5 eaters, including one able-bodied.

In addition to them, the local residents Miron Lebedev, Andrey Korobeinikov, Andrey Konstantinov and others took part in the uprising. Vasily Bityukov, who had arrived from Novosibirsk, was involved in the uprising. G. Uskov passed him off at meetings as a representative of Sibulon (Siberian Department of Special Camps), although he came to the Galkin commandant’s office for his wife and children. A special “troika” of the OGPU sentenced him to ten years in concentration camps.

In addition to the tent settlement of Leino, where, in fact, the uprising began, there was another center of the peasant movement – the village.Istomino. Here, next to the tents, there were huts made of birch bark and houses made of earthen bricks, since it was impossible to dig dugouts in the marshy soils of Bakchar in most places.

43-year-old Vasily Ivanovich Sidorkin, who arrived at the settlement from the Belovsky district, tells the investigator that on July 29 in the evening an assistant of the centenary Bushuyev came to his tent and invited him to a meeting, where the brothers Shiryaevs, Mishanin Kuzma, Kazanin and others were also present. Here, in a tent, an unknown citizen announced that the Soviet power had been overthrown in all cities, the Sibulonites of the Chainsky region spoke out, it was necessary to form a detachment against the communists, first of all to arrest all the watchmen, and then move to Galka.At the meeting, the organizer was supported by all the men …

This meeting has already been mentioned above, and the name of the agitator is known – FR Slavnikov. Forgive him for the lie about the uprising in all cities of Western Siberia. After all, not a single revolutionary movement was complete without a big lie.

The uprising in Istomin began on July 30. Sidorkin’s fellow countryman, the Belovo peasant Pyotr Klimyshev, who had 5 dependent children, recalls that when he went to the beast, there were already about 100 people, armed with axes, pitchforks, stakes, and shouted: “We need to arrest the commandants as soon as possible,” after which they spoke… “Through the window of the commandant’s office,” says Klimyshev, “I saw the watchman Trifonov and asked him to surrender without a fight, but he jumped out the window and disappeared. I didn’t shoot at him. At this time, they began to set fire to the house (commandant’s office), and who in this confusion killed Kudasov, an authorized commandant’s office, I do not know … “

The centenary headman Ivan Anufriev persuaded many settlers to participate in the uprising. Among them were Andrey Sinkin, Grigory Mazur and others. GM Mazur, who served in the Tsarist and Red armies for many years, was later a platoon commander.After the suppression of the uprising, he was arrested and died in the Tomsk domzak (there were no official prisons and hard labor in Soviet Russia – there were domzaks, isolation wards, concentration camps and other measures of “social protection”),

– Among the organizers of the uprising was Fyodor Rodichkin, an elderly man, interrogated call him “old man”, he developed a stormy activity. He actively gathered settlers for a rally, addressed them with a speech: “We must not be cowardly and let down the comrades who remained in Bakchar. Now you have to go to the village of Khamovka, on the go, arm yourself with anything – pitchforks, axes, stakes and others. “After that, the peasants boarded carts and drove to Khamovka, but an old man they met on the way dissuaded them from going there, since there were many soldiers in Bakchar.

The insurgent settlers were perplexed by the passivity of their neighbors in misfortune in Bakchar. According to intelligence information received by IB Malyshkin from Agafon Yushkov, the rebels told him: “What are they sleeping there? Why don’t they perform? ” From this, the agent drew a conclusion: it is likely that they (the rebels – V. B.) had an organization with the local (Bakchar – V.B.) immigrants and believed to make an uprising at the same time. The materials known to us on the uprising do not support this conclusion.

As already noted, the authorized Kudasov was killed in Istomin. The settler Efrem Yudin, who worked as an office clerk in the Istominsk commandant’s office, straightforwardly and frankly says: “Kudasov and I went to the garden, where we met three unfamiliar men, whom Kudasov began to ask where they were going, to which they answered something. Then a shot rang out from the side, which killed Kudasov… The war was declared for free labor against the communists, and the communists and representatives of the authorities were not ordered to be beaten, but only to be detained. ”

In the same district, Georgy Yazikov was nominated as a leader. He had a motley biography: “In 1919,” as he himself writes, “I took part in a partisan detachment against Kolchak.” In 1931, in the Belovsky district, he was dispossessed, but only his family was sent to the settlement, and he, as a former partisan and worked in industrial production, was left.In the summer of 1931, he took documents about his partisanship in the Belovsky OGPU and went to the Narym Territory to save his family. But two days after he arrived there, a rebellion broke out. G. Yazikov is disingenuous when he says that he was drawn into the gang under the threat of execution. Apparently, he, without hesitation, plunged into the thick of the events taking place there.

How this happened was told by Yegor Mitasov, a settler and 3 of the Novosibirsk District, who lived in 1931 in the village of Sewing of the Parbig commandant’s office; “The headman of the centenary, Beda Dmitry, drove out to the uprising, and the commander was Yazikov Georgy.We received the task to move to Kuznetsovka and seize the commandant’s office there, but they did not find anyone there. They searched and seized several guns and 2 rifles. Then we went to Krylovka, taking away weapons from the local population on the way. After Krylovka they moved to Krasny Yar, where they seized the commandant’s office, shot, wounded someone, but he still disappeared into the taiga. Then they moved to Vysoky Yar, not reaching it from half a kilometer. Yazikov scattered the detachment, and with a shout of “hurray” we captured the village.

The offensive was carried out under a two-color blue-and-white banner under the slogan: “Down with communism, long live free trade, free labor and the right to land.”

Encouraged by this success, the insurgent masses moved to Galka, i.e. to the Galkin commandant’s office in Bakchar. From the testimony of Pavel Morozov, a settler of the Rubtsovsky district, whose behavior was typical of the overwhelming majority of rebels, it appears that on July 31, after spending the night in Krylovka, the army moved to Galka, and 1.5 miles after Vysoky Yar met with a detachment of Reds. “On command” in a chain, “says Morozov,” I ran to the right flank to the river and ran back along it, met Bychkov there and surrendered together with him in Krasny Yar Red. “

Thus, the main clash of the opposing sides took place on the road to Bakchar near Vysoky Yar. By this time the rebels were, according to various sources, from 500 to 1000 people, they were divided into platoons, about 40 people. made up a cavalry platoon, which was better armed than the rest.

A native of the Tambov province, 50-year-old Alexei Mikhailovich Leonov said that when the detachment moved to Galka, the reconnaissance of three horsemen reported an ambush. The commanders lined up a detachment on both sides of the road in loose formation, and they did not go 150 yards when they opened fire on them.“At the command of the second platoon, in which I was, lay down and began to crawl forward,” A. Leonov confesses in his actions to investigator Yakimchuk, “there was no point in shooting before.”

During this shootout, the chairman of the Vysokoyarsky village council G. Pazderin was killed. The indictment speaks of two dozen killed insurgents, but it is difficult to believe this document, since there is a tendency to diminish the scale of the uprising, to underestimate the number of killed participants in the uprising.“The corpses lay as thick as sheaves in a field,” recalls NI Bannikov, who was 9 years old in the year of the uprising. – In early August, there were sultry days, and they began to decompose quickly. There was an unbearable smell all around. And the next year it seemed to us that it smelled bad there. ”

Despite the personal bravery of G. Uskov and G. Yazikov, who encouraged their subordinates, being under fire on horseback, the rebels began to retreat to Krylovka. It was announced that there would be a meeting, but many did not stay for the meeting, but went home.To those who remained, Uskov announced that “whoever wants to fight, stay with me voluntarily; whoever does not want to, let’s go home.”

Thus, July 30 – 31 was the peak of the uprising, which covered the territory from Ust Bakchar in the current Chainsky district of D ° Parbig in Bakcharsky. The activity of settlers was observed only in some settlements – the village. Lenino, Istomino, Krylovka, Bundyur and some others. In most of the villages of the Galkinskaya and Parbigskaya commandant’s offices, the uprising was passive, they participated in it under duress.At the same time, an allowance must be made for the fact that the insurgents who gave evidence to the investigator had no reason to stick out themselves among others, to exaggerate their role in the uprising. Here is the ingenuous story of 30-year-old Filimon Pilytsikov, burdened with a large family of 6 people, “On July 30, at 2 pm, armed people arrived in our village of Svetlo-Zeleny and began to involve people in a gang. I, Nikita Pervukhin, Andrey Koloda, Dmitry Gutov, got into this gang, and they drove us to Krasny Yar, and from there went to Komarovka, and they put me to guard the warehouse.They wanted to put me at the head of the village, but I made an excuse that I was illiterate. Then I went to my village to sleep, and in the morning, that is, on August 1, the Reds have already arrived in our village … “. Pilshchikov did not deceive the leaders of the uprising when he said that he was illiterate. 1 & d, the interrogation protocol has a huge fingerprint instead of a signature. After the suppression of the uprising in the village. Svetlo-Zeleny was publicly shot at 2 people. Who they are and where they are buried is still unknown.

Defeat of the uprising

To eliminate the consequences of the uprising, a consolidated detachment was formed from a cavalry platoon of the Tomsk militia, Kolpashevsky, Krivosheinsky and Chainsky party detachments, representatives of the Tomsk OGPU, which were distributed to separate units.The general command of this detachment was carried out by the head of the Tomopersector of the OPPU Plakhov. Quite a significant force of commandant’s offices, local activists and volunteers were headed by the head of the commandant department of the OGPU Zapsibkrai I.I.Dolgikh. Belkin, Pastushenko, Denisov, Zhuravkin were the chiefs of individual detachments here.

On the night of August 1, all these combined forces moved into the rebel area of ​​operation. On the way to the village. Krylovka “were removed” 2 outposts (the number of those killed in the documents is not specified), Bundyur was taken, where 8 workers of the commandant’s office were released.Soon 18 rebels will be executed in this village. At the freshly dug grave, they were laid face down and, on command, shot them in the back of the head. This order of execution was noted by eyewitnesses in other places as well.

On the morning of August 1, the detachment began an offensive on Krylovka, where, if you can call it that, the headquarters of the uprising, and a meeting was taking place at that moment. The “indictment” conveys the situation during this battle as follows: “During the shootout, the leader of the uprising Uskov, a number of officers and about 50 people were killed.active participants in the uprising … “. It also says about their losses: “During the entire operation from July 29 to August 2, more than 100 members of the gang were killed. 4 people were killed from the side of the party detachments ”.

The exact figure of peasant losses during the uprising is now difficult to name, but the indictment data is greatly underestimated. The lion’s share of deaths occurred during the suppression of the uprising by executions, which, as already noted, were not recorded in the investigative documents. Strongly similar to the mass execution “battle” in Krylovka, where almost a hundred of the rebels were killed, and the party detachments, also formed from non-professionals, did not even have wounded.

A note from the commander of the local party detachment Muravkin can serve as a reminder of the shooting of the rebels, who reports that “on August 1, at 7 pm, we met a group of bandits (40-50 people) near Vysoky Yar and had a weak clash with it, in which 8 kulaks were killed , a pair of wagon-drawn horses captured, 2 converted from a mower and 3 Berdanks. A guard arrested by kulaks was released there, too.

Summer 1931

Later, in 1967, KGB investigators recorded cases of single shootings in their interrogation reports.Was brought to the village. Komarovka and the settler Filat Sartakov was publicly shot, in the village. Ozernoye shot the headman of the village Ivan Pakhomov. The archive of IB Malyshkin contains a photograph of the settler Kudryavtsev, who was shot at the beast.

According to our preliminary calculations, the total number of losses of settlers and local residents during the uprising was at least 200-250 people. The uprising was drowned in blood. From a quarter to a half of its participants were killed, and, according to the recollections of eyewitnesses, “the guilty and the innocent,” that is, were executed.e. participants in the uprising and outsiders. The actions were aimed at intimidating the population, at the elimination of the settlers and thoughts of resistance.

However, even after August 1, the massacre of the rebels continued. Some of the rebels, 135 people, were arrested. This action of the special agencies is formulated in the “Indictment” as follows: “135 people of active members of the insurgent organization who had fled were seized by the security secret measures taken”. Thirteen rebels died in the Tomsk prison (domzake – from the Newspeak terminology of that time) from exhaustion and disease.According to the resolution of a special construction site, the PP OGPU ZSK dated October 21, 1931, out of the surviving 9 people received 10 years of concentration camps, the rest of 3 and 5 imprisonment, some were sent to other, more pernicious than Narym, places. One and 3 paradoxes of Soviet reality in the 30s. was that it was often easier to save life in the camp than in “freedom”. Of those sentenced to 10 years, GV Yazikov was the most unlucky. In 1937 he began to petition for early release. As the reasons for the mitigation of his punishment, he named his partisanship against Kolchak and shock work.In a statement, he wrote: “For 6 years I have not had a single comment from the leadership, not a single truancy. From the beginning of my term, that is, from 31, I worked on the construction of the White Sea Canal, from where, in S months, I, as a specialist-fisherman, leave for the Caspian, where I am serving my term in the Prorvinsky camp. At first he worked as a foreman, then as an instructor in the manufacture of fishing gear. In August 1935, for shock work, I was sent to a rest home in the Akhpunsky branch of Siblag … I ask the commission, taking into account my work in the camp, my diligence, to return me to the environment of honest and exemplary builders of the community.January, day 27, 1937. Signature”.

His request was granted, since in February 1938, in Nar’ma, the district department of the NKVD arrested and prosecuted 125 people for belonging to the cadet-monarchist insurgent organization “Russian General Military Union”. (All of them were shot, and GV Yazikov was listed among those executed. In addition to him, 7 more people involved in the uprising were shot, who by that time had freed themselves and returned to those exiled to the Nary families.Among them were V.V.Baev, I. Ya. Lebedev, A. M. Nikitin and others. It is possible that in other places in 1937-1936. the former participants in the uprising were “brought to justice” and shot.

The persecution of the participants in the uprising continued in the post-war period. For example, in August 1945, Maksim Nikitich Morin was arrested, who at that time worked as a groom in the Molchanovskiy district health department. During interrogation, he confessed that in 1931 he lived in the village. Sewing. This settlement was a settlement, 75 families of exiles still lived there.Maureen himself at that time was a district leader and took part in the arrest of the communists and two Komsomol members. Then he managed to escape, changing into the clothes of the murdered settler, and leaving him his own. Therefore, as he says, in the documents he was considered killed. What are these documents and where they are stored – we were unable to find out.

Fate was more merciful to the other participants in the uprising already mentioned in the article. For example, Vasily Bityukov, sentenced to 10 years in concentration camps, was released before the war. In the camps, he worked on the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, worked well and was released ahead of schedule.In 1967 he lived in the village. Furnaces of the Kemerovo region. and gave evidence to the investigation.

N.V. Korovin, the former chairman of the Tiginsky village council, served his sentence in the BAMlag, worked as a groom. As the military department characterized him, “he treated the work satisfactorily, did not participate in cultural work, and was not noticed in Soviet activities”. And he managed to stay alive.

In 1967 Kolmogorov Danila Gerasimovich applied for rehabilitation. After the suppression of the uprising, he was also sentenced by the troika to 10 years in prison.After serving his sentence, he was detained in the camps of Siblag “until further notice” and was released only in 1945. At the time of the uprising he was 17 years old and he arrived at the place of settlement voluntarily, since he himself was not dispossessed, but accompanied the exiled to Narym’s grandfather’s family. In Istomin, where 37 people were arrested, he was the centenary head of the 5th precinct. According to D. 1G. Kolmogorov, he was condemned incorrectly, confused with another Kolmogorov – Nikolai Sergeevich, who was a district leader and took an active part in the uprising.

In the face of confusion, hasty and unqualified investigation, this could well have been.

All of the above materials testify that people doomed to suffering and death were forced to defend their lives and dignity using available means. But they did not stain their hands with the blood of innocent people and even those guilty of their torment. The representatives of the authorities who died were mentioned above – they all died in the shootings. There were no tortures or executions of communists on the territory of the uprising.As for the actions of the party detachments, here only part of the truth about their reprisals is told, over the rebels – the rest remains a closely guarded secret.

The peasant leaders quite accurately assessed the prospects of the life of the special settlers in the conditions of the approaching winter. Tents, huts, and even barracks from the damp forest did not save you from the cold. The hungry ration caused exhaustion among the settlers and, as a result, widespread deadly diseases that mowed them down by the thousands. I was told more than once that in the area of ​​the village.Gorelovka killed more people at that time than in the entire Chainsky region during the last World War II. All in all, on the territory of the Galkinskaya and Parbigskaya commandant’s offices in the winter of 1931-1932. killed at least 20 thousand people.

“People’s Tribune”. 8.08., 10.08., 13.08. 1991 No. 88, 89, 90.

Where did the “militias” come from in southeastern Ukraine :: Politics :: RBK

“Donetsk People’s Republic militia” over the weekend seized administrative buildings throughout the region, including army warehouses in Slavyansk, where blood was shed during clashes.The Ukrainian authorities and the West believe that the uprising in Donetsk is the work of Russia, but the “militias” themselves say that there are no Russians among them. Representatives of the Russian authorities talk about the impossibility of a military invasion of Ukraine, but pro-Kremlin experts do not rule out that this may be required to save the Russian-speaking population.

Hello, weapons

During the weekend, riots covered almost all major cities of the Donetsk region of Ukraine.Armed people, who proclaimed themselves supporters of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Russia, managed to seize administrative buildings in Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, Yenakiev, Krasny Liman and other cities. “These were prepared actions, we are trying to legitimize the People’s Republic of Donetsk,” Miroslav Rudenko, one of the commanders of the People’s Militia movement, which took responsibility for the seizures of buildings, told RBC.

The main events took place in Slavyansk, a city with a population of about 120 thousand.people in the north of Donetsk region. On Saturday, armed men occupied the regional police department, the city council building and the building of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), tore down Ukrainian flags and hung out the flags of the DPR. As the mayor of Slavyansk, Neli Shtepa, said in a telephone conversation with RBC, the buildings were seized by fighters of the People’s Militia movement of the self-proclaimed governor of the Donetsk region Pavel Gubarev, who is in a pre-trial detention center in Kiev.

As one of the “volunteers” told RBC, several army depots with weapons are located in Slavyansk, all of them are now under their control.“We also have weapons from the regional police department in our hands – 24 submachine guns, over 400 Makarov pistols and cartridges for them,” said the interlocutor of RBC.

“About a hundred people came to the city. They said they were” people’s militias “. They seized the buildings. They seized 400 pistols and 20 machine guns from the police. According to the mayor, the “militias” armed themselves and “dispersed to the nearest settlements – Gorlovka, Mariupol, Kramatorsk, Yenakiyevo.”Another 350 protesters lined up as a human shield near the administrative buildings. The insecurity of the protection of administrative buildings is caused by the fact that “Berkut” and the police went over to the side of the protesters from Donbass, Olena Blokha, assistant secretary of the Donetsk City Council Sergei Bogachev, told RBC.

In response, the Kiev authorities sent an anti-terrorist detachment to Slavyansk. On Sunday, as a result of military clashes at the entrances to the city, an SBU officer was killed, Ukraine’s interim Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov said on Facebook.According to him, the head of the anti-terrorist center and four fighters were also wounded. According to the press secretary of the “independent government of the DPR” Yekaterina Mikhailova, when a convoy of armored personnel carriers approached Sloviansk, it was met by local activists.

“As a result of the shooting, one SBU soldier was killed and two local fishermen, traditionally dressed in camouflage, were wounded. They were shot by soldiers in black uniforms without insignia sent by the military junta from Kiev,” Mikhailova said.“Immediately after that, the column of armored vehicles turned around and drove towards Kharkov.”

Read on RBK Pro

Gubarev’s army

Judging by eyewitness reports and numerous videos, some of the armed people are former Berkut fighters, some are representatives of the so-called self-defense of Crimea. Ukrainian media claim that the equipment of the invaders testifies: these are Russian special forces. According to the presidential candidate of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko, in the eastern regions, officers of the Russian FSB took up arms.”There are no so-called separatist movements, but there are FSB units simulating separatism with weapons and identification cards from the Russian special services,” she said on Sunday.

Ukrainian presidential candidate Petro Poroshenko said that those who seized the buildings in Slavyansk are “representatives of the regular part of the special forces of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of another state” (quoted by Interfax-Ukraine).

Donetsk region.Checkpoint at the entrance to the city of Slavyansk.

In Sloviansk there are about 500 representatives of Donbass groups, divided into two groups, said Dmitry Tymchuk, head of the Ukrainian Center for Military-Political Research. According to him, 200 people are representatives of the entourage of one of the oligarchs (his name is not disclosed), another 300 people are representatives of the entourage of one of the well-known crime bosses, Tymchuk wrote on Facebook. General management of actions, according to Tymchuk, is carried out by coordinators of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

Although the GRU special forces of the General Staff of the RF Ministry of Defense really played a key role in the “Crimean operation”, in the current events, as the RBC source at the General Staff assured, the Russian special forces are not yet taking part. “Nonsense of a gray mare – allegations that disguised Russian special forces are operating in Slavyansk,” the officer noted. “Firstly, the Russian leadership will not expose its military in this way, and secondly, not a single sane special forces soldier will agree to take off his uniform, hand over documents, it is not clear what to change and to go to fight it is not clear for what. “

According to the assumption of the Russian military, veterans of the special services and Ukrainian military pensioners are now working in eastern Ukraine. “The military retire very early, and even earlier, taking into account participation in military conflicts. It is these caring people who have now taken up arms,” ​​said a RBC source in the Russian General Staff.

In the “Self-Defense Army of the Donetsk Republic” RBC said that in their ranks there are also many Cossacks, unemployed, recently demobilized young men, there are also miners and active policemen.”But all the locals, there are no Russians in our ranks,” said an interlocutor of RBC from Donetsk. Another “self-defense member” told RBC that there are Crimeans in their ranks who defended the independence of the peninsula and are now helping Donbass. “But I have not seen their Russian passports, maybe they haven’t had time to get it yet, but I would not say that they are Russians,” he said. The “self-defenders” estimated their number at 600-700 people.

Waiting for reinforcements

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Sunday once again demanded to withdraw Russian troops from the border and not to enter the territory of Ukraine.Pictures of Russian military units near the Russian-Ukrainian border taken by the NATO High Command for Europe (SHAPE) crisis center were released on Friday.

“The Russians have a significant number of forces, including planes, helicopters, special forces, tanks, artillery, infantry fighting vehicles … and they could start moving in a matter of hours,” said director of the center Harry Dicken. According to the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Armed Forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, about 40 thousand troops are concentrated in the border areas.military personnel.

Professor of Political Science of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy Aleksey Garan reminds that no one has canceled the permission of the Federation Council for the introduction of Russian troops. “The position of the Ukrainian authorities is to try to avoid mass bloodshed, otherwise it will give Putin the opportunity to introduce troops,” the Ukrainian political scientist noted.

An activist guards a seized police building in Slavyansk

The Russian Defense Ministry does not comment on reports about troops on the border, redirecting them to the Russian Foreign Ministry.The Foreign Ministry refers to eight inspection flights over the Russian-Ukrainian border, during which foreign observers found nothing. “It would be strange if they found something, it would be a failure of our commanders in army disguises,” said a source at the RBC Defense Ministry. “From April 14, observers will once again, this time from the United States and the Czech Republic, fly to check the border , and you will see, again they will not find anything. ”

An active military pilot told RBC that he was not sure that such a large grouping was really kept near the border, as NATO states: “But there are troops there, I personally saw several brigades, they are located about 40-50 km from the border, in Rostov, Belgorod and Kursk regions.They definitely keep tanks, armored personnel carriers, BRDMs there. “

One of the contract soldiers of the Pskov Air Force Division told RBC that several aircrafts fly to the border areas with Ukraine every day.” eat dry rations, “he explained. The number of troops currently grouped in close proximity to the Ukrainian border, RBC sources and military experts estimate at about 10-15 thousand.human.

The number of the Ukrainian army is about 125 thousand servicemen. How many of them are located in the eastern regions of the country, experts find it difficult to assess. With the exception of parts of the airmobile forces and special forces units, which are good for pinpoint local operations and are useless for use in large-scale army operations, the Ukrainian army is not in a state of combat readiness, Ihor Korotchenko, a member of the Public Council under the Russian Ministry of Defense, is sure.

We are not introducing troops

A source of RBC in the Presidential Administration called the statements about the possible introduction of troops into Ukraine speculation.”There will be no introduction of troops,” he said. Leonid Slutsky, the head of the Duma committee for CIS affairs, told RBC that Russia would “strictly monitor the situation, but would not rush to use armed forces.”

Pro-government political scientists interviewed by RBC believe that there are no grounds for the introduction of troops into Ukraine yet, but hypothetically they do not exclude such a possibility. None of the scenarios for the development of events – from a sharp exacerbation and military intervention to a gradual return to a calm settlement option – can be ruled out, says Alexei Chesnakov, director of the Center for Current Politics.”If there are casualties among the civilian population, if there are threats to a significant number of citizens or there are facts of the use of special forces against them, then Russia is unlikely to be able to stay on the sidelines,” he is sure.

If they shoot at the Russians, Russia will not be able to stand aside, says the former head of the Kremlin’s internal political department, head of the Civil Society Development Fund, Konstantin Kostin. If the interim authorities of Ukraine do not act adequately, that is, “go to negotiations, meet and listen to people, then Russia will have to defend the Russians in all ways.””For now, the childlike spontaneity of the Ukrainian authorities scares me,” Kostin continues.

Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchinov yesterday ordered the use of the country’s armed forces in suppressing the speeches of pro-Russian activists. Turchynov said this in an address to the Ukrainian people, which was broadcast by the Rada channel. According to Turchinov, “a large-scale anti-terrorist operation” will be carried out in the east of the country.

Svetlana Reiter, Ivan Petrov, Mikhail Rubin, Vladimir Pavlov, Stepan Opalev, Maria Makutina

90,000 Revolution of 1917

Five days after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, elections to the Constituent Assembly will begin.According to the official results, the Bolsheviks will win only in Moscow and Petrograd, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries will lead the whole country. On the territory of the future Kazakhstan – as well as in general – the elections were rather chaotic, the results were calculated for a very long time, and the data available today can be considered rather arbitrary. For example, researchers know that in the Turgai region, out of five deputy mandates, two were won by the Social Revolutionaries, and three by representatives of the Alash party. A similar success (which, however, did not transform into real power), the national democrats won in the Semipalatinsk district.In the city of Uralsk, the overwhelming majority of votes were given to the Cossacks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. In each individual case, the election results eloquently reflected the interests of those who, for the most part, lived in a particular territory. Obviously, many Russian settlers feared and viewed the upcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly as a threat – especially in Turkestan, where the elections did not actually take place. There, the Bolshevik coup was perceived as a transition to the dictatorship of the Russian population and a return to the colonial regime.On January 5, 1918, the Constituent Assembly will meet in the Tauride Palace. On the same day, soldiers of the Petrograd garrison will shoot a demonstration of its supporters. The deputies will never get together again.


The Cadets as the “party of the enemies of the people” will be banned first – in October 1917. Lenin decided to hand over all its leaders to a revolutionary tribunal.

The Socialist Revolutionaries, whose representative presided over the first and only meeting of the Constituent Assembly, after its dissolution proclaimed the struggle for the immediate resumption of work as a priority task (however, as you know, they did not succeed and were finally divided into right and left; some of the latter entered the Bolshevik party, others – went into the partisan underground).

The Mensheviks declared the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks as “violence against the will of democracy”, called for the unity of all proletarian forces and decided to organize a homogeneous power “from popular socialists to the Bolsheviks.” At the same time, this was hindered by the contradictions between various trends in the Menshevik milieu itself.

Siberian regional officials decide on the need to “start organizing a temporary Siberian socialist government” and appoint the opening of the Siberian Regional Duma in January 1918.To prepare it, the congress elected the Provisional Siberian Regional Council headed by Potanin.

Cossack military governments declared martial law in their regions, the new Bolshevik government was not recognized, but they were in no hurry to enter into armed confrontation. Maintaining order in conditions of anarchy has become their priority.

After the coup, the Alash party published a draft of its political program, convened a second all-Kazakh congress in December and formed the Kazakh (Alash) autonomy without the approval of the Constituent Assembly, declaring its intention to take over all executive power over the Kazakh population.She tried to rely on the Turkestan autonomists, Siberian regional leaders and Orenburg Cossacks.